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MANIFESTLY it is not a treaty of peace which the representatives of Russia and Germany have recently signed. It is a bond of future enmity. If it stands it will merely write into the public law of Europe the most irreconcilable international feud in history. Its manifest result will be to incarcerate the people of Great Russia in a house without doors or windows, with scarcely a chimney. It will cut them off from future commercial and industrial development and condemn them to remain an association of agricultural villages. It will deprive them of every essential of economic independence and of national integrity. If they submit their submission would be equivalent to a confession of political and moral subservience. They would be condemned thereafter to play a part similar to the part which northern Africa played during the days of Roman imperial prosperity. They would provide food and raw materials for a German industrial and political oligarchy. For this reason their permanent submission is inconceivable; and since it is inconceivable we can only hope that the revolt will not be postponed. Russia may be incapable of physical resistance, but it is capable of moral resistance. The all-Russian Soviet, which will assemble at Moscow on March 12th, will still have the alternative of yielding temporarily to military force, but of refusing to endorse any paper which even for a few months consents to national indignity.

SURELY the Russians must realize the penalty of acquiescence. Once such a treaty is accepted by the all-Russian Soviet, the German government would dedicate its ingenuity and energy to set up a government in Russia which would be loyal to the treaty of peace; and it would have at least for a while the assistance of all the counter-revolutionary groups in little Russia, in white Russia, the border provinces and in great Russia itself, whose personal and class prosperity depends on the destruction of the revolution. Peace will not save the socialist republic. It will strengthen every interest favorable to reaction and weaken every interest opposed to progress. The immediate future of the revolution depends upon its ability to summon to its assistance the Russian national susceptibilities, which are certain eventually to be aroused by the German aggression, just as the German national feelings were aroused when Napoleon, by the use of analogous methods, was seeking to make Central Europe subservient to French imperialism. German imperialism is over-reaching itself as French imperialism did; and if resistance is continued its downfall may be swift and as complete as is its temporary triumph. In order to bring into existence the conditions most favorable to its early downfall, the all-Russian Soviet must refuse to make Russian revolutionary authority the accomplice of the German autocracy; the Allies must declare their intention of fighting indefinitely rather than consent to such a peace; and finally, in order to encourage Russia, the Allies should indicate their willingness to recognize the government of the all-Russian Soviet, provided it refuses to ratify the proposed surrender to German imperialism.


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IF the meeting of the Russian soldiers', workers' and peasants' council takes place in Moscow on March 12th, its deliberations and decisions are likely to have a decisive effect upon the course of political progress or reaction throughout the world during the next few generations. There the Russian revolutionists will decide whether they will call the moral forces latent in Russian nationalism to their assistance or whether they will encourage the future revival of Russian nationalistic imperialism as the only means of shaking off the German yoke. In all probability the action or the words which during the next week emanate from the Allied statesmen will determine the decision. Yet they seem to be choosing this critical moment, when the very life of democracy in eastern Europe is hanging in the balance, as a favorable opportunity for inviting Japan to join Germany in attacking the Russian revolution and in violating Russian soil. Will not President Wilson speak?

THE German-American Alliance may be able to clear itself of every charge of lukewarm patriotism during the war. We have not the least doubt of the loyalty to America of the overwhelming majority of its members. Nevertheless, we question the political expediency of all such nationalistic organizations. It may be said that the fundamental purpose of the Alliance is purely cultural. It wishes to add to our stock of cultural values. We are a people of diverse origins, and we ought to avail ourselves of the opportunity of drawing upon many cultures, and of founding on this basis a culture of our own that is unique, if not superior to others. Not only ought we to strive to induce the immigrants who come to live among us to make themselves good Americans; the immigrants ought also to strive to transmit to us whatever ideas and ideals of value they have brought with them. All this is admitted. But shall we be more likely to do this if the German-Americans, the Russo-Americans, the Italo-Americans withdraw themselves from the general social body to form little nationalistic cliques of their own? Especially when such cliques play politics, as they inevitably do? America has been hospitable to the immigrant. She has been tolerant of his individual peculiarities. But she cannot remain tolerant of organizations that cut squarely across the lines of our common life and plant on our soil the racial factionalism that distorts the political life of the states of Central Europe.

HOUSING for the workers employed in shipbuilding is assured under the act appropriating $50,000,000 for this purpose. But it is not enough to be assured that the workers who are to build our ships will not altogether lack shelter. What kind of houses are to be built, what arrangements are to be made for the kind of community life that will keep the workers contented, are questions for which we still anxiously await an answer. Are our housing authorities going to content themselves with the erection of flimsy shacks to be pulled down as soon the war is over, or will they build for permanence, recognizing the fact that the problem of housing our workers will remain with us after the war, and that any contribution they may have made toward its solution will fall to the credit of their industrial statesmanship? These are questions that presented themselves to the British government early in the war. The economy and speed of construction of temporary shelters were thoroughly considered. But, although the prospective drain of the war upon British resources was incomparably greater than the drain we have to face, the British government decided in favor of permanence in its housing plans. The argument for permanence is even more cogent now, when it is coming to be clearly understood that the world has entered upon a struggle for substantial democracy—democracy that takes economic as well as political conditions into account.

THE affirmation of the Mooney sentence by the Supreme Court of California will not set at rest any of the doubts as to his guilt entertained by unprejudiced men everywhere. The court was not registering the opinion of its members on the question of Mooney's guilt or innocence. By law it was narrowly restricted to determining whether Mooney had received a technically fair trial, whether the evidence that led to conviction was properly introduced, and whether at the time of the trial the evidence was of such a character as to seem credible to reasonable men. The court could not take cognizance of the fact that at a later date the chief witness for the state had come to be so thoroughly discredited that he could not be placed on the witness stand in the trial of Rena Mooney and Weinberg. Neither could the court take cognizance of the fact that the prosecution itself came to be seriously discredited by the exposure of its methods of preparing evidence. There is a logical presumption that if Mooney were granted a new trial he would be acquitted just as Rena Mooney and Weinberg, against whom the prosecution had an identical case, have been acquitted. But the Supreme Court of California, under the present law, has no right to occupy itself with logical presumptions, all important as these may be from the standpoint of justice. Fortunately there are no technical limitations to prevent the governor, with whom the decision of life and death

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now rests, from giving due weight to all the relevant facts in the case. It is inconceivable that without more reliable evidence than that upon which Mooney was convicted, the governor will be willing to assume responsibility for the carrying out of the sentence of death.

THERE is now before Congress the Trammell-Keating bill to establish a minimum wage for women in the District of Columbia, and its passage will be of importance to more than the comparatively small number of working women in the District. It will mean recognition by Congress that women in private employment as well as men and women in government service must be paid a living wage if health and efficiency are to be of truly national concern. The bill follows closely the provisions of the Oregon law, upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court. It provides for a board of three members and subordinate boards for separate occupations. The employers, the employees and the public are represented. The minimum wage rates will be fixed only after due inquiry into the cost of living. An investigation in the District showed that of 600 working women interviewed 274 received under $400 per year, and when one remembers that food staples have increased more than forty per cent in the last two years the need for the Trammell-Keating bill becomes uncomfortably evident. If the District of Columbia joins the twelve states who already have minimum wage commissions and the seven who have established minimum wage rates, it will set a salutary example for the whole country.

WHEN a people distrusts a political remedy that is being concocted for them, and when it still requires political remedy, there is a good chance of serious unrest. The Irish convention has been defunct too long to be endangered by the intransigence in the west of Ireland, but that intransigence adds a fresh snarl to one of the worst fumbled problems in the hands of the present British government. The trouble does not originate with the men who are now defying the law in Clare, but with the men who are shirking the responsibility of making laws at Westminster. The only agreement possible to the present British Cabinet on the Irish question was a negative agreement, to give Ireland a sleeping powder. Unfortunately for this formula, the dose fails to work in remote Clare. Had Lloyd George secured popular confidence in Ireland for his doctored convention, the situation in Clare could be classed as ordinary lawlessness. The convention, however, was arranged in obsequious deference to existing prejudices in the British cabinet. The fact that it has no popular prestige has encouraged vigorous nationalistic youth to make trouble, and martial law can only dramatize and fortify their cause.

ONLY the most successful conduct of the war would remit the criticism that this sort of futile compromise arouses; and Lloyd George has not won the success that would drown criticism in applause. A revision of his policy, if not a complete change in the government, is proving to be indispensable, and a change in the government that means the ascendancy of labor and radical opinion with respect to Ireland is probably England's only way out. Numerically, the Irish people do not count heavily among the claimants on political justice, and politically their hardships owe something to the liveliness of Irish imagination. But the stumbling-block to a solution of home rule is so obviously a junker class and a junker concept of the British empire that to shrink from going forward is to hurt democracy's morale here and everywhere else. Every shift has been tried, every appeal to a solidarity that is still in the making, every promise of deferred payment and credit in heaven. But the failure to give Ireland home rule is too complete to be sophisticated, and a government that is ready to give it will present an undisguisable claim on those who see the requirements of democratic morale.

## The Need for Wilson Diplomacy

*"Today was spent in studying the German Chancellor's words and in examining the collapse of the Allied peace offensive, as conducted by the President. Every one admitted the collapse. In administration circles only war was talked."*

*C. W. Gilbert, in the New York Tribune.*

A QUOTATION such as the foregoing reveals a hopeless misunderstanding of the political aspect of the war, the objects which the President's "peace offensive" is intended to serve and the results by which its success or failure must be measured. Mr. Gilbert apparently believes Wilson diplomacy has collapsed because the German Chancellor returned an unsatisfactory reply to the President's last speech, because the German army is invading Russian territory in order to discredit and, if possible, to destroy the Russian revolution, and because it is more than ever necessary to fight on in order to defeat the manifestly aggressive designs of the German government. But the success of the Wilson diplomacy never de-

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pended on its ability to obtain an immediately satisfactory peace proposal from the German government. Neither was it expected, in the event of failing to obtain such a proposal, to bring about an immediate revolution in Germany. That was its essential difference from Trotzky's diplomacy. It is conditioned on military and economic opposition to the plans of the German government, and it is not intended either to convert the German government with phrases or to demand of phrases the accomplishment of a result which can only be accomplished by force. But, inasmuch as the winning of the war is essentially a political job, Mr. Wilson realizes the impossibility of winning it exclusively with military and economic agencies. His peace offensive is an attempt to derive the strategy whereby the political victory will ultimately be obtained from the moral superiority of the Allied cause.

The events of the past few weeks only emphasize the need of the Wilson diplomacy. Never since the German army was defeated at the Marne and at Ypres has the German menace loomed so large and so ominous as it does at this moment. Never was the danger so real of an ultimate settlement of the war, which will tend to perpetuate the influence and power of the German ruling class by perpetuating and even intensifying that competition in armaments and in imperialist national policies, from which this class derives its reasons for existence. Yet this danger looms larger than ever, not because the German army has won any additional triumphs or because the German submarine is a decisive weapon, but because the Allied diplomacy has suffered in Russia a deplorable defeat. The use to which the German government is putting this political victory, its evident determination to employ the opportunity, presented to them by the political strategy of the Allies, of destroying the Russian republic, opens up a prospect of an indefinite continuation of the war; and it is precisely because the Germans have won a political victory and the fighting must be prolonged that the Wilson diplomacy is more than ever necessary. It is not only the one political strategy which will prevent the Germans from winning another victory such as that which they have won in Russia, but it is the one strategy which will supply the people of the Allied countries with the moral endurance which will be called for by a prolonged war. If they are to be asked to fight very much longer they will demand, and will be entitled to demand, an assurance of the unequivocally democratic and popular character of the programme for which they are fighting.

All over Europe the people are war-weary. Their social and industrial mechanism is breaking down under the intense and prolonged strain. They are hungry and tired, and in many cases disillusioned. They cannot for much longer warm their chilled bodies at the smouldering ashes of their earlier hopes and fears and passions. The craving for peace is daily becoming more widespread, more articulate and more importunate. Other peoples as well as those of Russia will soon be frankly clamorous for peace, and, even if the clamor is confined to the masses, that will not be true of the temptation to yield. There are many indications of an increasing disposition to consider peace on the part of those classes in Europe which until recently have been most "jusqu'auboutiste." We cannot be sure which of the belligerents will first succumb to this peace agitation. It may be Austria-Hungary. It may be one of her enemies. But whoever succumbs first, the general war-weariness is a fact no less fundamental in the strategy of the war than the number of German divisions on the western front or the amount of tonnage sunk each week by the submarines. It could perhaps be ignored in case the prospects of an early Allied military victory were as good as they were in March of last year, but manifestly they are not. A military victory must wait at least until the summer of 1919 and will call for largely increased American military preparations and economic sacrifices. The statesmen of the Allies are confronted with the problem not only of preventing the peace craving from being used to impair the chance of political victory for their cause, as it has been in Russia, but, if possible, of converting it into an instrument of German defeat.

The people of the Allied European countries and of America will never be persuaded to undergo the additional sacrifices and sufferings which will be needed to defeat German aggression by an exclusive programme of military victory. A policy of military victory which is not subordinated to an unequivocally democratic joint propaganda of war aims is merely presenting the old diplomacy with a blank check to fill in as it is willing or is able; and the secret treaties reveal the kind of settlement which it would like to write. Those treaties are still in force, except in so far as they involve obligations to or by Russia. If the western democratic peoples are asked to prolong their sufferings and sacrifices for the purpose of presenting a blank check to the old diplomacy, they are likely one by one to follow the example of the Russian democracy. They will prefer insubordination, and perhaps revolution, to a war which is being so managed that no matter which side wins a military victory, democracy and popular interests are exposed to a political defeat. As the mistakes of Allied diplomacy in Russia prove, the stubborn insistence that victory is the only war aim will not serve

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either to defeat Prussianism or to counteract Bolshevikism. On the contrary, it will act as an ultimate provocation to revolution in the democratic countries of the west, as a barrier against revolution in Central Europe, and as an ultimate condition favorable either to a German or to a frankly imperialist peace.

The Wilson diplomacy is born of a sense of popular sufferings, needs and aspirations. By tieing the prolongation of the war with all the bonds of good faith to an unequivocally democratic settlement, it provides the needed answer both to revolutionary socialism and to victorious Prussianism. It will infuse into the democratic peoples the will to hang on until the end, which is necessary for victory, and almost to the same extent it will little by little undermine the moral resistance of the peoples of Central Europe. But its ability to accomplish either of these results depends first upon the speed, the scope and the vigor of American military and industrial preparations, and secondly upon a quick and courageous carrying on of President Wilson's diplomatic initiative.

The Wilson diplomacy has not "collapsed," but it runs a danger of collapsing unless it is developed still further by Mr. Wilson and sustained by America's European associates. The weakness of the President's policy consists in the isolation of its author, and, of course, his enemies in Germany and in this country have not been slow to point it out. Reactionary American newspapers, like the New York Tribune, are outraged at the spectacle of an American President who presumes to assert an American policy different from that of European diplomats and who tries to make essentially American political experience and ideas of use to European associates at a moment of joint responsibility, opportunity and peril. They would have Mr. Wilson restore "unity" by incontinently backing down and by allowing the diplomacy of the war to be conducted by the people who wrote the secret treaties and have systematically alienated the Russian democracy. But the only political bond these leaders have tried to give to the anti-German alliance is that of a common desire for territorial annexations, and such a unity is lacking in political principle and moral vitality. Military victory as the only war aim, supplemented by silence and secret treaties, will present German diplomacy with the opportunity of picking off the constituent parts of the alliance one by one, as it has already picked off the Ukraine, by offering to satisfy some part of the particularist territorial ambitions, while it will deprive the masses of the people of the hope which the Wilson diplomacy has already aroused in them, that the war can be used to infuse democracy into the social and international bodies. The proponents of the old diplomacy subsidized the Ukraine, which accepted a German peace and alienated the revolutionary Russia which did its best to resist such a peace. Unity among the Allies must be based not on the typically German subordination of political to military strategy, advocated by the New York Tribune and Mr. James M. Beck and Mr. Charles Hughes, but on a typically un-German proclamation of democratic war aims and on the subordination thereto of every exercise of military and economic force.

To be sure, the higher and more enduring unity of the anti-German Alliance cannot be obtained without a struggle. It will demand the control of the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy by the more liberal and democratic political parties. It will cost the American government the overt hostility of American militarists and reactionaries. They are steadily becoming more frank in their opposition to the President's address of February 11th. But, as the New Republic has always insisted, the defeat of militarism in Germany depends on the triumph of liberalism and democracy in the Allied countries. The French, English and American advocates of the subordination of political to military strategy might with the help of autocratic Russia have been able to organize a victory over the German armies, but they did not know how, as the secret treaties proved, to use such a victory to discredit militarism. That task must be undertaken by political leaders who are unwilling to use the necessity of resisting German militarism by arms as an excuse for promoting militarist politics at home and who, without flinching from the need of fighting German autocracy with military weapons, realize the impossibility of winning the political victory without supplementing military with political weapons. The Wilson diplomacy is seeking to create throughout the world a political atmosphere which will prevent not only German militarism but all militarism from breathing, and it cannot succeed without introducing some temporary divisions among the Allies and within the Allied nations.

It is a dangerous but necessary process of purging. The President's campaign, by tending to undermine the politics of military power, even when it emanates from the Supreme War Council at Versailles, and to reinforce the politics of principles and their public discussion, even when it emanates from Vienna, provides the only basis for enduring unity in and among the Allied nations. The bond between the western democracies must be leavened by the radicalism of their domestic policy and the internationalism of their foreign policy. That is the penalty they pay for the advantage they derive from calling themselves democracies and for

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appealing to the democratic spirit to resist German militarist aggression. After almost four years of war they are still divided just in so far as they cling to the politics of military power and to precisely the same extent have they promoted German unity. They are united in so far as they abandon the politics of military power and to precisely the same extent will they impair German unity. If the politics of power as contrasted with the politics of ideas is allowed to prevail we shall create a divided association of democracies, a united Central Europe and at best a settlement which ignores principles and merely redistributes power among the powerful. But if the politics of ideas is allowed to prevail, we shall create a firm alliance of democracies and an increasing division of the people of Central Europe from their rulers. The democratic nations will then gain the moral endurance with which to continue the war until the politics of power and the militarism associated with it collapse amidst the execrations of the peoples. In his February address, more explicitly than in any utterance since January, 1917, President Wilson has appealed from the governments of the world to the peoples for the support needed to crush the militarist politics of power wherever it is to be found and to create a society of nations which will incarnate the alternative politics of ideas. It is a policy which must be carried on no matter what the opposition it arouses among reactionaries at home and abroad, for if it is not the sacrifices which have already been made to destroy militarism will have been made in vain.

## The Great German Offensive

THAT the coming of spring would be attended by the greatest German offensive of the war was a generally accepted opinion two months ago. The collapse of Russia had made available immense reserves of men and guns for use on the western front. America could not make her power felt until late in the summer, at best. Accordingly, the relative offensive power of Germany was certain to be greater in the spring of 1918 than it was in the spring of 1917 or can be in the spring of 1919. Of this Germany is well aware; if then she cherishes any hope of a victorious peace, she must make her supreme effort this spring. Now or never she must break through to Calais and Paris and shatter the Allied power through a peace imposed upon France.

These are cogent reasons for believing that a terrific offensive is coming. They are binding upon those responsible for the Allied military plans. It would be calamitous if doubt as to the German intentions relaxed in the slightest degree the efforts of the Allies to make their defenses impregnable. For safety the coming offensive must be assumed by the military authorities to be a certainty. But with this reservation, it is lawful to raise the question whether conditions after all are so favorable to Germany that she can afford the risk involved in an attempt to roll up the Allied lines. She protests, indeed, that she is ready to take these risks. She wishes us to believe that the great offensive only waits upon open weather. But is this necessarily more than a part of her peace propaganda? German diplomacy has not yet lost its confidence in terrorism. If the Allied peoples can be made to believe that failure to negotiate will mean unprecedented casualty lists, will they not attempt to force their governments to make peace? This, to be sure, is to misinterpret the temper of the Allied peoples, but it is a misinterpretation sufficiently characteristic of the Germans to give us a right to discount the threatened offensive.

How great is the likelihood that the Germans can actually roll up the Allied lines? If they could withdraw the whole of their forces from the Russian front—and they can not yet safely do this—they would presumably have a preponderance of men. Possibly they would also have a preponderance of guns. The conditions of last summer, when the British and French held a preponderance of men and guns might be reversed. As the Germans were on the defensive in 1917, the British and French may have to remain on the defensive through 1918. As the British and French were able to nibble into the German lines at various points, so it may be possible that in the coming spring and summer the Germans may be able to nibble into the Allied lines. All this is at any rate conceivable. Such an offensive policy as the Allies pursued through 1917 is not excessively costly. At least, the defensive suffers nearly as heavily as the offensive. But this is not the kind of offensive the Germans are threatening. What they want us to believe is that they intend to break the Allied lines over a front so wide that they can send whole armies through to fight in the open. What such an operation would cost, in relative losses, is something that cannot be calculated. Unless it succeeded completely in demoralizing the defense, the heaviest losses would almost certainly fall upon the offensive. Germany may have a present preponderance, but can she have such a preponderance as to assure success in an operation involving heavy odds against her? It appears certain that the Allied commands believe she has not. They believe that the lines will hold.

In German domestic politics the military party is now in the ascendant. Their Russian successes have renewed their hold upon the state. This is

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indicated sufficiently by the setback that franchise reform in Prussia has received. Now, if peace could be concluded on the basis of the territorial status quo ante on the west, but with the acquisition of important provinces on the east, the political dominance of the Junker and military chief would be assured probably for another generation, at least. This political dominance would be still better assured if a complete military victory could be won in the west. The prize is great. But if the military party plays for it and loses, it runs the risk of losing everything. If after a million casualties the German people find themselves possessed of nothing more valuable than a few thousand hectares of French or Belgian soil which they will have to evacuate in the end their elation over Russian successes will prove extremely evanescent. A desperate offensive that proved vain would be rather more than even the strongest military party in the world could survive.

Against the fact that a great German offensive stands a better chance of succeeding in the coming season than at any later time we must set the fact that Germany has a better chance of securing a favorable peace in the coming season than at any later time. If Germany tries an offensive and fails, she loses her chance of a favorable peace. She will have demonstrated once for all that she can not win over the Allies, even with American military resources practically untouched. A Germany thus weakened physically and morally can not expect another opportunity to make peace before the accessions of American troops have restored a preponderance to the Allies that will in the end be sufficient to thrust the Germans out of France and Belgium. Then Germany will have another opportunity to make peace, but not the kind of peace that enhances the prestige of Junker and war lord.

Germany is under the necessity of undertaking an offensive in the coming season, but whether it is to be a military offensive or a peace offensive, whether it is designed to strengthen the present rulers of Germany by military or by diplomatic methods, yet remains uncertain. In either case, it is the imminence of full American participation that spurs the Germans on to the offensive. If America could be counted on to lag indefinitely, the Germans could afford to wait, saving their men and directing their diplomacy toward the securing of every possible concession, trusting that war-weariness would break the morale of England and France before the German people became demoralized. America's reply to either threatened offensive is the same: We shall make haste. We are populous enough to raise armies before which the depleted forces of Germany can not stand. We are possessed of the resources and the mechanical ability to equip these armies, and to provide the ships to carry them to France. We are not bent on a knock-out blow; we would at any time subscribe to a just and honorable peace. Such a peace Germany does not offer and we shall hasten our preparations all the more because Germany is trying to delude the world into believing that her peace without specifications would prove to be a just peace. And if Germany proposes to stake everything upon an endeavor to force a military conclusion, let her calculate well her chances, for another year will throw the sword of America into the scales of settlement.

## Japan is Menacing

AMERICAN opinion should not allow itself to be deluded into accepting the version of Japanese intervention in Siberia which is supplied by the press dispatches from London and Washington. The columns of the newspapers are being used by the opponents of American policy with respect to Russia in order to blind the American people as to the effects and the meaning of Japanese intervention. If Japan is allowed to intervene the diplomacy of the Allies will have committed its most egregious and probably its most costly mistake. It will have written in words too large to be ignored and too explicit to be misunderstood its disagreement with the Russian and American effort to divorce the Allied statecraft from imperialism. Any excuse will do for Japanese intervention. As long as the Germans were advancing towards Petrograd the military occupation of eastern Siberia was defended by the ostensible necessity of preventing the German army from seizing the military stores in Vladivostok, which were separated by five thousand miles from the nearest German soldier. When a nominal peace is signed between Russia and Germany, it is no less necessary to occupy Siberia in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from handing the stores over to Germany. As if the "peace" which the German government had forced on Russia could be considered, as long as Russia remains democratic, equivalent to a future alliance. In truth the one way of encouraging the Russian to seek in despair the protection of Germany would be to occupy eastern Siberia with Japanese troops. The Russian revolutionists would inevitably interpret the intervention as a declaration by the Allies of war against the Russian Revolution. They would consider it as the infallible evidence of a conspiracy on the part of the capitalist nations to overthrow the first socialist republic.

There are no military advantages to be gained by undertaking military operations against the Bolsheviki which can weigh for one moment against

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the moral and political penalties of such a policy. Now that the German government by the use of its usual ruthless and brutal methods has forced a humiliating and impossible peace on Russia, the Allies can by refusing to recognize the treaties and by encouraging the Bolsheviki to persist in embarrassing the Germans in every possible way convert Russia from an incapable belligerent into at least a friendly neutral. Japanese intervention would make such friendly neutrality on the part of Russia out of the question. If Eastern Siberia is seized with the acquiesence of the Allies, they would in effect be consenting to the German occupation of the Baltic provinces by admitting the validity of the principle upon which the German occupation is based. For the German and the Japanese excuses are fundamentally the same. They both justify military intervention and occupation for the alleged purpose of suppressing Russian disorder on their own threshold.

If this is a sound excuse in the case of Japan, it is a far sounder excuse in the case of Germany. Russia and Germany have a long land frontier in common. On the Russian side of the frontier there is a considerable German population, whose persons and property would be imperilled in case they were not protected by German troops. The Russian revolutionists have clearly announced their intention of propagating "disorder" in German territory. If, consequently, the practice of invading a neighboring country for the purpose of preventing revolutionary agitation in one's own territory is justifiable, the Germans have a strong case, and the case is all the stronger because when the occupation and the invasion were undertaken the two countries were at war. But Japan is not at war with Russia, or will not be at war until she violates friendly or neutral Russian territory. Eastern Siberia is a part of Russia remote from the existing centres of revolutionary agitation and disorder. It is separated by the sea from Japan and the Japanese government can easily prevent the disorder from spreading to its own territory. Under such conditions, if the German invasion is abhorrent to right minded men, so is that of Japan.

Let there be no mistake about the effects of such an action. Should the Allies consent to it they would be returning to the dangerous principle which underlay the secret treaties. Those treaties practically allowed Russia to dictate the settlement in the east, France to dictate the settlement in the west and Italy to take what she would from Austria and Greece. They recognized spheres of special influence in which the national interests of the several Allies should be allowed unhampered expression. Japan is in substance advancing a claim of this kind in the Far East. It is insisting more and more upon a free hand in that region, and she resents not only any interference or any opposition from any one nation, but from all nations. She is in effect preparing to dispute the constitution of an international authority, which would be entitled to interfere with her plans. If the Allies consent they will be granting to Japan a privileged position in the Far East which will place insuperable difficulties in the way of a successful peace conference. They will, in substance, be acquiescing in von Hertling's plan of a "peace of shreds and patches," based on the triumph of special national interests over international authority and justice.

## Berlin to Peking

LITTLE by little the re-arrangement of the world projected by German imperialism is revealing itself. It has now become sufficiently plain that Germany is no longer aiming at an exclusive dominance of the world. She is willing to compromise with other imperialisms alongside of her own. And her spirit of compromise goes so far that she is willing to see other imperial powers aggrandized, along with herself, at the expense of the weaker nations. She would not be averse to a situation in which the more powerful of her present enemies would find themselves entangled with her in a relation of imperialistic complicity.

Compromise with England naturally occupies the most prominent place in the German peace scheme. And this, on the surface, appears impossible. England holds the German colonies. She also holds enough of Palestine to safeguard her position in Egypt, and enough of Mesopotamia to place a quietus upon the Berlin to Bagdad ambition. As an offset, Germany holds Belgium, and if she could permanently remain in possession of Belgium, the military menace to England would outweigh all the benefits England could derive from the German colonies and the conquered portions of the Turkish empire. But Germany can hold Belgium only by force of arms. Recognized possession is unthinkable. As a pawn, therefore, Belgium is worth little. In the game between England and Germany, then, England holds the cards. This the Germans know they will have to recognize before they can arrange a peace.

But cannot Germany let England keep what she holds and compensate herself at the expense of Russia? At first thought one is disposed to reject this idea as fantastic. What have Russian conquests to offer that would compare with the splendid dream of a Teutonic sphere of influence extending to the Persian Gulf? Germany was not aiming so much at the profits of developing the

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resources of Mesopotamia as at a trade route that would tap the boundless wealth of the Far East. Without gorging herself to bursting with contiguous Russian territory, Germany might acquire natural resources equivalent to those of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. But what is there to compensate her for the loss of the potentialities of one of the three great land routes into Asia?

Why, one of the other land routes. Let us recall that since ancient times the products of Asia have found their way into Europe by three routes, one following the course now marked by the Berlin to Bagdad railway, the second a course roughly corresponding with that of the trans-Siberian railway, and the third through the highlands of Central Asia, from China through Bokhara and Samarkand to the Caspian Sea. Goods brought west by this route were shipped across the Caspian and thence by a safe route along the valleys of the Kur through Tiflis to the Black Sea, where an easy voyage conveyed them to the mouth of the Danube.

As every one knows, the builders of railways have not neglected to develop this route, as they have developed the northern route and are now developing the Mesopotamian route. There is a railway from Batoum, on the Black Sea, to Baku, on the Caspian, and another from Krasnovodsk, on the opposite side of the Caspian, through Bokhara, Samarkand and Kokan to a point not far from the boundary of Chinese Turkestan, through which it could be extended without encountering serious engineering obstacles along the ancient caravan route to Peking.

Now, the peace treaty with Russia apparently assures the Central Powers control of this trade route. The cession to Turkey of Batoum, Kars and other territory not easily identifiable from the reports doubtless means the loss to Russia of the lands south of the Kur, along which the railway from the Black Sea to the Caspian takes its course. Controlling this railway, the Central Powers can control the Caspian, and with it the railway into Central Asia from Krasnovodsk. If then the Russian treaty stands, the Germans have, if not the route they set out to acquire, at least one of the chief Asiatic trade routes. Is this route a fair equivalent for what they lose if they give up the Bagdad project?

Let it be granted that after the Caspian has been crossed, much of the route lies through deserts, yet the territory has maintained Bokhara and Samarkand, cities not unfairly to be compared with the great cities that have flourished in Mesopotamia. The mineral resources of Central Asia are very imperfectly explored, but they must be immense. When the route is pushed through to China, a huge volume of traffic ought to be available. And this would be non-competitive traffic, whereas any through traffic over the Anatolian railways would be exposed to water competition. In time of peace none of the bulky products of India could go to Europe by the Berlin-Bagdad railway. Even the wheat of Mesopotamia would have to go to the Gulf of Persia, to be conveyed by water to Europe, if it were not to arrive saddled with such heavy charges that nobody could afford to eat it. As for the mineral oil of Mesopotamia, its only practicable means of conveyance to Europe would be by tank steamer. The Central Asian railway, on the other hand, would monopolize all the freight originating in its territory. And, while land shipment would be interrupted by two considerable sea voyages, this would be all to the good, from the point of view of transportation economy. Finally, while the Mesopotamia route would be exposed to flank attack from Europe and might easily be blocked from India, the Central Asian route would be practically safe against attack, except from Siberia. And even from Siberia an attacking force would have to operate over roads traversing long desert stretches.

It is true that much of the territory through which this central route lies will remain under Russian sovereignty. But the population is non-Russian; indeed, it is more nearly akin to the Turkish than to any other western people, and a German-Turkish imperialism might be expected in the end to detach it from Russian dominion. And with Turkestan Teuto-Turkicized, the field would lie open for operations in the Chinese hinterland.

It is not to be supposed that Germany, though counting on a Central Asian imperialism peculiarly appropriate to her character as a land power, will readily give up her ambitions elsewhere. But she wants peace; and if she can compensate herself in the east with values no one else is really aware of, why should she not assume a conciliatory policy? England wants Belgium free. Well, what is Belgium in Germany's grandiose schemes? France wants Alsace-Lorraine. Germany could afford to give up enough of Alsace-Lorraine to make it difficult to keep France in the fight. Italy wants the Trentino; let her have it. The western powers are insistent that Palestine and Mesopotamia shall not go back to Turkish misrule. Very well; Germany can be magnanimous. As to the German colonies, they might be surrendered for a cash consideration. Is it not clear that if Germany could, today, get the representatives of the Powers around a council table she might persuade them to subscribe to a peace, a peace that gave something to everybody now fighting, and to Germany a prize that would in the end prove so brilliant as to reanimate the waning spirit of imperialism throughout the world?

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# Toward Democratic Control

MR. McADOO'S appointment of Mr. W. S. Carter, President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, as Director of Labor in the new railroad administration is one of the most interesting developments in the relation between the government and labor which the war has brought about. It looks like a real step in the direction of the democratic control of the basic industries, over which the government is rapidly extending its direct authority.

The railroad brotherhoods have for years taken advantage of their strategic position to force their influence beyond the ordinary issues of collective bargaining into the field of administrative policy. The so-called eight-hour controversy, which resulted in the enactment of the Adamson law, was really more than a controversy over hours and wages. Fundamentally it was a controversy over the right of the brotherhoods to a voice in the management of the railroad properties. This is one of the reasons why the Adamson law contributed more to the nationalization of the railroads than it did to the establishment of harmony between the railroad managers and their skilled employees.

This fact lends added significance to Mr. Carter's appointment. There exists at the moment a Railroad Wage Commission which is investigating and reporting to Director McAdoo on the entire railroad wage question. This commission is expected to report its findings and recommendations affecting all classes of railroad employees, almost two million men, within two weeks. So far as any one knows, it will go out of business as soon as its recommendations are made. Then, unless some new body is created to take its place, there will exist no body specifically charged with the further adjustment of wage disputes and the determination of the railroad labor policy except the administrative hierarchy of the brotherhoods represented by Mr. Carter.

As Director of Labor, Mr. Carter will have charge of all questions of labor administration under Director McAdoo. He will probably choose as his first assistant a representative of the shop craft unions, which are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor as the brotherhoods are not. He will hear all complaints of labor, organized and unorganized, and will advise Director McAdoo in advance of all decisions affecting the status and claims of labor.

Through this arrangement the brotherhoods and the American Federation of Labor will have a direct voice, but no vote, in the management of the railroads, for Mr. McAdoo has not delegated any of his absolute power of final decision. Mr. Carter's authority remains purely advisory. But neither the brotherhoods nor the shop craft unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor seem to be worrying about this limitation. A new door has been opened to them. The shop craft unions have come to an understanding with Director McAdoo under which some three hundred thousand men have agreed for the period of the war to do overtime work necessary to repairing, to modify their apprentice rules and to allow all applicants for work to be employed regardless of their union or non-union affiliations. This looks like an important concession. But it is really an important union gain, because many of the railroad managers have hitherto been bitterly hostile to the unions, and have been able to frustrate their attempts at organization. The rule laid down under the new agreement provides that "mechanics applying for employment will not be denied such employment for any cause other than inability to perform the work." This means that the field has been cleared of all barbed wire entanglements, and that the shop craft organizers are free to go ahead. And the brotherhoods are unanimous in expressing their confidence that the government will treat them with equal liberality. The managers of the various railroads are now acting purely as government agents, and it is probable that they will decline to make decisions with grievance committees of their old employees on their own initiative; they will naturally be disposed to pass this responsibility on to the government itself. And this apparently means that all grievances emanating from members of the brotherhoods will be left for final adjustment by Director McAdoo acting on the information and advice of Mr. Carter.

From the point of view of the workers, this looks like a very satisfactory arrangement. But what of the public that must ultimately pay the bill? At the moment possibly the most far-reaching decisions handed down by any government agency dealing with labor are those which have come from the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board. The decisions of this Board have been deeply influenced by the fact that many of the shipbuilding concerns are building ships for the government on a cost-plus basis. These concerns have shown a marked disposition to be silent partners to wage disputes. They have apparently taken the position that since the government pays the bills, any arrangements arrived at by the Adjustment Board and the workers are not only satisfactory to them, but more than satisfactory, since every increase in cost increases their earnings on the cost-plus basis. The Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board is made up of a representative of the workers, a representative of the employers and a representative of the public,

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who acts as chairman. The assumption has been that the interests of all the three parties would be given equal weight in the Board's decisions. But the employers have not pressed their ordinary interest because it has been neutralized by the cost-plus arrangement; and, in as much as the most pressing interest of the public has been the production of ships, the representative of the public on the Board has generally been disposed to take a lenient attitude toward the *ex parte* demands of labor as the shortest cut to increased production. This has resulted in an immense increase in the cost of ships, which the public must ultimately meet.

We do not intend to suggest that the wage schedules fixed by the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board are in excess of what the workers are reasonable in demanding. There is no ground for supposing that the men are getting more than they are fairly entitled to. In the one conspicuous instance where the Board fixed a district wage scale below the highest scale paid by a private employer, as it did on the Pacific Coast, the Emergency Fleet Corporation promptly superseded its decision by allowing the men an additional bonus. What we do intend to suggest, however, is that in all of these adjustments involving an ultimate burden on the public, the representatives of the workers and the employers, as well as the specific representative of the public, should regard themselves not as special pleaders for special interests, but primarily as representatives of the major interests of the public at large.

An analysis of the many important controversies that have hampered the production of essential war supplies makes it plain that they have either arisen or have been seriously aggravated by the *ex parte* approach of the management and the men. How to create a situation in which all parties may be induced to place the public interest first is one of the most important problems now before the government as a whole, and more specifically before the national railroad administration. The first step already taken by Director McAdoo suggests that a further approach to a real solution lies in the direction of a further extension of democratic control. As the case now stands, every American citizen is pro tem. a shareholder in the railroads. Under private management it was customary for the shareholders to exert their control over their properties through a board of directors which in turn functioned through various sub-committees. Among these there were usually committees on finance and executive policy which laid down certain limits within which the chief executive officer was free to act. In theory always, and generally in practice, these committees, like the board of directors itself, acted not so much as representatives of special interests, but primarily as representatives of all the shareholders.

Is it not possible that a similar arrangement might modify the present partisan spirit of managers and men who are now inclined to approach the Director of Railroads as special pleaders? Might it not help the present precarious labor situation if, instead of a Director of Labor only, the Director of Railroads would appoint finance and executive boards made up of representatives of the managements, the men and the shareholding public, with specifically delegated powers over expenditure and administrative policy? If such an arrangement were made is it not likely that the representatives of the various special interests on these boards would be impressed with a sense of primary responsibility to the public?

Director McAdoo has issued instructions to labor that there must be no interruptions of work because of controversies between management and men, and he has warned the managers against arbitrary conduct that might create the suspicion that they are interested in making public ownership of the railroads a failure. So long as the private companies are guaranteed a fair return upon their investments during the period of public ownership they are not likely to push their opposition to wage increases very far. There is a real danger, however, that the men may defeat their own avowed interest in the success of public ownership by taking advantage of the present critical situation to push their demands further than a discreet sense of public responsibility would warrant. What the public wants is efficiency at a reasonable cost. Might not the best means of insuring this result be the appointment by Director McAdoo of representative boards that would share with him his present heavy responsibility for financial and executive decisions?

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# Efficiency and the "He-Man"

THE New Republic has printed several letters in criticism of its editorial attitude toward administrative "efficiency" at Washington; and I have myself received a considerable number of personal letters, very personal, from readers who assure me that they see completely through my little game of trying to "undermine" Mr. Baker and Mr. Wilson and are well aware, and want me to know they are well aware, that I am doing my best, puny but my best, to destroy all "liberals" and all "liberalism" at Washington in order to create an "efficiency" which will be operated by persons of the "he-man" type.

These allusions to the "he-man" are echoes of the days when the War Department was first investigated by the Senate. Various Senators, various editors, various leaders of business, expressed the opinion that the industrial enterprises of the United States Government should cease to be headed by pacifists and idealists and theorists and humanitarians and should begin to be headed and masterfully brought to success by "he-men." On inquiry I gathered that the "he-man," the ideal "he-man," is a person about as follows:

He has managed a very large business, and he has said to thousands of people come and they have come and he has said to them go and they have gone and he has said to them stand on your heads and they have stood on their heads, and he lives in an office in which there is nothing on the table but a blotter, and he has a woman secretary who gets ten thousand dollars a year for keeping the table clean and her mouth shut, and he gazes at the table, and he calls in his head-salesman and says three words and a rival business disappears for lack of orders, and, above all, and let it be repeated, above all, he takes no nonsense from Labor. He would machine-gun Sam Gompers as casually as clip a clay-pigeon, if Sam got in the way. He is the Shakespearian Harry Hotspur of our times, with labor-leaders doing the turn of Scots. "He kills me some six or seven dozen labor-leaders at breakfast, washes his hands, and says to his wife: 'Fie upon this quiet life! I want work.'"

Such is the "he-man," at his climax; and I am supposed by these readers of mine to be laboring to make him monarch of all I survey. I therefore beg to be allowed to set down a few words with regard to "efficiency" and "liberalism" and "autocracy" and "he-men," in their relations each to each, as I see them, for the conduct of this war and for the conduct of the new age to succeed it.

I must begin by asking my readers to remember the three things to which my articles have been principally devoted.

The first is the threadbare but indestructible idea of a "central administrative planning and directing agency," which, in itself, is neither "liberal" nor anti-"liberal." If the President should fill it with persons in the image of Mr. Baker, it would be "liberal." If he should fill it with persons in the image of Mr. Burleson, it would be anti-"liberal." But the President himself is more like Mr. Baker than he is like Mr. Burleson—much more. Therefore I have every reason to hope that the personnel of the "central administrative planning and directing agency" would be predominantly, if not exclusively, "liberal." I shall later try to show why, in my opinion, if it is to be thoroughly successful, it should be exclusively "liberal."

The second thing to which my articles have been devoted is the idea of a distinct separate agency for the purchase of war-supplies; and I hope my readers will not have failed to observe that Mr. Baker is in increasing agreement with it. Every new reorganization of the War Department is now tending toward a greater and greater separation between the men who come into direct contact with industry and the men who come into direct contact with warfare. And if General Pierce, our Director of Purchases, and Mr. Stettinius, our Surveyor General of Purchases, and Mr. Baruch, our rumored new chairman of our War Industries Board, are "liberals," they will naturally endeavor to pursue a "liberal" industrial policy. But suppose they pursue an anti-"liberal" policy?

Why, then, if Mr. Wilson would only create that "central administrative planning and directing agency," the remedy would be instant. By definition, the duty of that central agency is to give administrative information to the President continuously from all departments and then to give administrative effect continuously, throughout all departments, to the President's decisions. Any such central agency would have secretaries whose sole occupation would be the ascertainment of facts and the enforcement of decisions. This scheme of administration, far from contracting the personality of our "liberal" President, would, as I have specifically pointed out, enlarge and extend it to the farthest edges of governmental activity. It would provide what is not provided today—a constant daily check, along those edges, on all deviations which might there occur from the "liberalism" which is triumphant at the centre. Such deviations do now occur, and occur numerously.

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But I proceed to the real difficulty. The third thing I have advocated is that our central agency and our war-supplies purchasing agency shall introduce a "plan" into the industry of the United States and shall see to it, for instance, that the quantity of farm goods produced and the quantity of factory goods produced shall be in harmony with our genuine needs and with the amount of transportation genuinely available—which is bound to mean, in present circumstances, that numbers of human beings must be induced to get out of factories and to get on to farms and railways. It is this third thing, apparently, which fills the minds of certain of my readers with a picture of a vast national industrial "machine" in which a few men will sit at "levers" and in which all the rest of us will be ignominious "cogs."

I protest against that picture. For me, at any rate, it is not an accurate picture of "efficiency." I think that the "efficiency" which can be represented simply by the figure of a "machine" is outdated and dead. I think that even Germany itself is in process of going beyond it. I think that the figure for "efficiency" must now be sought not so much in the field of mechanics as in the field of chemistry and even of bio-chemistry. "Efficiency," national "efficiency," is not a lathe or a locomotive, in my view, so much as—I venture to say it—a ferment. It is, it seems to me it must be, a working ferment of self-conscious modern individuals in self-conscious multitudinous associations; and the statesmen who operate it successfully will have to be dealing with living "organisms" and living "reactions" even more than with "levers" of mere command and "cogs" of mere obedience.

In other words, I happen to think that "efficiency," the only possibly successful national "efficiency," is today a "liberal" thing and not an anti-"liberal" thing—a point to which I wish to return in a later article. Here I content myself with noting that the average "he-man" is conspicuously hostile to the three chief necessary developments in the national "efficiency" of the United States.

First. National "efficiency" requires that there shall be a very considerable increase in the number of public governmental controls and activities, as illustrated by our new control of railways. The "he-man" philosophy in this matter came to the surface in an amendment which Senator Lodge offered to the railway bill. We took over our railways because they could not privately weather the industrial storms of the war. Everybody knows that the period following the war will be just as industrially stormy. Nevertheless Senator Lodge proposed that the period of post-war control should be reduced from eighteen months to six. He got the support of twenty-eight Senators. Twenty-two of them were Republicans. Among the forty-seven Senators who voted against him, only nine were Republicans. This sort of vote is said to show that the Republican party is "reactionary." The word "reactionary" is unfair. It insults the past. I prefer to say that this sort of vote indicates that the Republican party under its present leadership is less "efficient," less able to meet the bread-and-butter common-sense needs of the country, than the Democratic party under the leadership of Mr. Wilson. If Senator Lodge's amendment is a specimen of the "efficiency" we are likely to get from a Republican Congress, it will be the duty of every believer in "efficiency" to vote against the Republican ticket next fall. The Republican party, as a party of "efficiency," seems likely to be utterly ruined today by the "he-man" philosophy. Modern national "efficiency," in every country, is demanding certain new governmental industrial controls for "efficiency's" sake. And the average "he-man" looks at virtually every new governmental industrial control indiscriminately with suspicion and even with hatred. Therefore I cannot be laboring for the "he-man" or for anybody like him when I labor for "efficiency."

Second. National "efficiency" requires a bargaining with Labor, a bargaining through which there shall be not merely a recognition but an actual stimulation of Labor's collective feelings and collective efforts. Again the "he-man" is hostile. The National Industrial Conference Board, representing some forty groups of manufacturers, presented a classic memorandum last fall to the Council of National Defense. It said that there should be no interruption of work by strikes or lock-outs and no attempts to change closed shops into open shops and no attempts to change open shops into closed shops and, in general, no departure from the status quo. Did it propose that employees should offer to remove all restrictions on output and that employers should offer to restrict their profits? Did it propose any bargain through which a genuine increase in productivity could be achieved? Did it propose that employers would give a collective promise not to cut their piece-rates if employees would give a collective promise to work regularly and to work at full speed? Not at all. In the midst of war it proposed the status quo. This is not "efficiency." It is petrifaction. "Efficiency" in every country today is demanding an awakenment of Labor's latent collective capacity for more work and better work. The average "he-man" detests the idea. Therefore, again, I cannot be laboring for him when I labor for "efficiency."

Third. National "efficiency" in agriculture requires an encouragement of cooperative marketing

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and of cooperating banking agencies, private and public, as seen roughly in the programme of the Farmers' National Non-Partisan League. Once more, as the millers and bankers of the north-west have proved, the "he-man" is alarmed and indignant. Cooperative and public agricultural industrial agencies may flourish in Germany. They do flourish in Germany. Germany today is not merely "autocratic." It is also well on its way toward being "functional." It is well on its way toward having multitudes of associations, sometimes called private, sometimes called public, which discharge social "functions" under the direct control of their own members. Our "he-men" are sometimes suspected of intending to "Germanize" the United States in "efficiency." No fear. They are not, in "efficiency," pro-German. They are *pre*-German. In agriculture a development of cooperation, under public auspices, is absolutely necessary for "efficiency." The average "he-man" resolutely opposes it. When I labor for "efficiency," on the large scale, on the national scale, I do not labor for him. I labor against him.

These are the reasons why I think that the President's central administrative agency should be composed exclusively of "liberals." Here and there I find a "he-man" who, in spite of having been a "he-man," is thoroughly a "liberal." Him I would use. But the average "he-man," who recoils from governmental controls and from bargainings with Labor and from the development of cooperation in agriculture, would lead us, in my opinion, not to "efficiency" but to stagnation.

What I would say to "liberals" is this:

Be "liberals." Do not be mere anti-"conservatives." There is a "liberal" efficiency. And it is the genuine "efficiency," which will genuinely work. Promote it. Make the "liberals" in office accomplish it. Make them put it into action. Otherwise the "he-men" will come back and congeal the United States for as long as they hold power.

WILLIAM HARD.

# Bolsheviki and Jacobins

Since February 5th, when this article was written, events have invalidated some of the statements, but not its diagnosis of Bolshevik motives.

THREE months ago the alignment of forces in eastern Europe was sharp and simple. There was a war between the Central Powers and the Entente. By an almost imperceptible transition a new war has taken its place, cutting across it, confusing it, transforming it. It is the revolutionary war of classes which the Bolsheviki have declared. The misunderstanding of these disconcerting persons has passed through three distinct phases. First came the grotesque period of ignorant hostility in which they were thought to be hirelings purchased by German gold. The second phase of hesitating sympathy was only a little less mistaken. Kerensky's phrase that Russia was "worn out" worked its way slowly to the public understanding. We dimly grasped the proportion of Russia's colossal suffering, when we heard that from first to last she had mobilized over twenty million men, and counted her dead at some figure over five millions. We visualized the bread queues in the towns, the villages without spades or ploughs, and the railways without engines or trucks. We prepared ourselves to forgive her, if she should save herself by a separate peace, and we supposed that the Bolsheviki differed from the rest of a starving and war-weary nation only in acting a little more ruthlessly and a little more logically on the general impulse of self-preservation. That also was the German reading of the position, and they expected to meet at Brest weary and hungry men, whose self-respect would be easily satisfied by a few tactful, but empty, phrases about "self-determination" and "the rights of nationalities."

In the third phase, the progressive press, in England at least, swung from pitiful tolerance to open admiration. These weary, starving, haggard men behaved with amazing spirit. They had not come to Brest to lend themselves to a diplomatic comedy. They showed no disposition whatever to compromise, and as they called for the total evacuation by the German armies of Courland, Lithuania and Poland, and the unflinching application of a democratic referendum, the German victories melted away, and three years of military defeat and disintegration vanished from the records. This astonishing Trotzky, at once subtle and audacious as only a Jew turned rebel can be, seemed to be retrieving by argument what the Grand Duke Nicholas had lost by arms; surprised into generosity, the former critics of the Bolsheviki now hailed them as the stoutest champions of nationality and democracy in Europe. Once more they were mistaken. Nationality is not a socialist fetish, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is far from being what the rest of us mean by democracy.

We have still one lesson to learn about the Bolsheviki, and it is that they mean exactly what they say. They are not pacifists, nor nationalists, nor democrats. They are working with unshakable

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faith and superb audacity for one comprehensive object. It is not peace, separate or general, but social revolution. The difficulty of understanding them is that we have all grown up in more or less familiar intercourse with socialists who did not mean what they said. For the first time since the Paris Commune, a Socialist party is really working for a social revolution. They have got it in Russia, the reader will object, why are they not content to work it out constructively there, without troubling about the rest of the world? Why must they upset the bourgeois governments of Finland and the Ukraine, and carry the revolutionary war into Rumania? Why do they not conclude an ordinary business peace with the Central Powers, if peace is what they want, or better still, keep their place, passively at least, in the Allied ranks?

The answer is simple, and it is once more, that the Bolsheviki are Socialists who really believe what others repeat. They are convinced that the social revolution must necessarily be international. For my own part, I remain a sceptic as to the permanence of any revolution so complete and sudden as theirs, and instinct teaches me to dread the inevitable reaction. But to understand them one must provisionally accept their hypothesis. They have made a social revolution and abolished all private ownership of land and industrial capital; their problem is to maintain it. They reason that sooner or later they will have to face the hostility of capitalist civilization. For the moment, they may profit by the fact that the world is divided into two camps and neither half has its hands free to deal with them. But their world is the future, and they are thinking now of what they will have to face when the rest of us make peace. Will international capital consent to leave them alone? There are already some warning symptoms. They noted the hostility of the western European conservative press to Kerensky, though his socialism was of a mild, evolutionary brand. They noted the popularity in the west of all the anti-socialist leaders, first of Miliukoff, then of Korniloff, and, finally, of Kaledine. They heard our English newspapers calling for "a strong man" to restore "order." They were anxious about the intentions of Japan. Then came the warning diplomatic symptoms, especially the refusal to "recognize" their government or their ambassadors. Finally, when they quarrelled with the Ukraine, the French government made it a loan of £7,000,000, in spite of its readiness to conclude a separate peace—a plain, business peace—with the Central Powers.

All this was, in point of fact, largely misunderstanding. The west does not as yet trouble itself much about Russian socialism; it was suspicious because Russia had withdrawn from the Alliance, and the abominable notion finds favor in some quarters, that we may now make a good peace for ourselves by sacrificing Russia. To the Bolshevik mind, however, these are merely preliminary symptoms of the inevitable war between socialist Russia and capitalist Europe. They feel what the French felt, when Pitt refused to "recognize" their ambassador, Chauvelin, and Biron, his attaché, was thrown into a sponging-house. The Bolsheviki are the Jacobins come to life again with more logic, more humanity, and as much audacity. They see, as the Jacobins did, the inevitable war of ideas, and they have decided that the better strategy is a bold offensive. Timid men would have trimmed and walked with caution and tried to avoid the logically inevitable war. They think, with their Marxian training, that they can read the page of the future, and therefore, they anticipate what must come. When they repudiated their foreign debt they knew perfectly well that they were challenging a great power, but they reason that however cautious they might be, the power of international finance will always be their implacable foe. In a sense they are right. How could they, on the basis of a completely socialized state, have resumed, after the war, the ordinary relations of trade and credit with the bankers and the trusts and the concession-hunters of the rest of the world? Sooner or later, the coalition against them would be formed.

What, then, is their policy? Nothing less than to revolutionize the rest of the world. That is what the French resolved to do in 1792, and the Bolsheviki are at least as clear in their aim. It sounds incredible, when we think of their exhaustion and poverty. France seemed no less exhausted. Did not Pitt predict early in 1793 that the war could last only a few months because France was bankrupt? He failed to reckon on the exaltation of the revolutionary temper. The Jacobins, moreover, developed a genius for organization, and those who know Lenine describe him as a Carnot with the same will to impose order upon chaos. I do not for one moment suppose that Russia will fight in the conventional way, as France did, or meet the hostile Powers with their own weapons. She has at her disposal a subtler strategy than that, and Trotzky is applying it with consummate skill.

One gradually divined, as the dialogue went on at Brest, that what Trotzky is really demanding for the occupied provinces, is not so much national freedom as conditions favorable to the social revolution. Why does he refuse to recognize the Polish regency as a body competent to arrange the referendum? It is not a pro-German body, though to Austria it probably is partial. Its Polish patriotism is above question. But it is undoubtedly bourgeois. When Trotzky asks for a Polish council composed

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of parties " which have proved their vitality," what does he mean by this pretty euphemism? I suggest that he means a " Soviet," a predominantly socialist council. Why does he urge that order should be maintained after the German troops withdraw, exclusively by the native soldiery, including those now in Russia? In Courland, at least, one knows how this would work out. The Lettish regiments from Courland are Bolsheviki to a man. It is fairly clear that Trotzky is working for conditions in the border provinces favorable to social revolution, and that the Germans insist on maintaining a garrison, largely because they fear a revolution. They are not the only people who fear it. The Polish conservative press has begun to write in tones of wild alarm, and on this front a new alignment of forces is taking place. The Polish propertied classes, formerly pro-Russian, look to Vienna for safety. The proletarian parties, which used to be violently anti-Russian, are rallying to the Bolsheviki. While Trotzky argued at Brest, a general strike broke out in Warsaw—a strike against the German occupation.

When the Bolsheviki began to apply their singular tactics to the enemy, the rest of us smiled at their faith. It seemed a hopeless advantage to bombard the German lines with a long-range idea. The event has proved that Trotzky is the shrewdest tactician in Europe. When he insisted on public debate at Brest, dragged out the discussions, and punctuated them by long intervals for quiet thought, one realized that he might get some support from the German progressive press and possibly from the Reichstag. He did get it, but it was more than balanced by the furious activity of von Tirpitz and the Fatherland party. It was not on journalists and parliamentarians that Trotzky counted, however. He relied on the masses, and he has not been disappointed. One thinks of a skilful labor organizer, who gradually widens the area of a dispute, stimulates " sympathetic " strikes, and " calls out " one related trade after another. First he " called out " Austria, and when that stroke succeeded, he " called out " Germany, too. Both these strikes were the work of the rank-and-file, and in both the revolutionary left wing was able to carry with it the cautious, opportunist, parliamentary Socialists.

The author of the pioneer strike in Vienna seems to have been a certain Otto Bauer, a young Socialist " militant," who had been a prisoner of war in Russia, and had there received flattering fraternal attentions from the Bolsheviki, who eventually sent him home. He has paid his debt to them. The inevitable demands for more food, more liberty and political reforms figured in the programmes of both these strikes, but their purpose was unquestionably to enforce an immediate peace without annexations. The significant fact about them is, that they broke out first of all in the war-industries and the naval yards, and proved the ability and the will of the masses to hamper preparations for an offensive. In so far as the object is to counteract the activities of the Fatherland party, to intimidate the general staff, and to put an unanswerable argument into the hands of moderate politicians who aim at democratic reform and an early peace, this " demonstration " strike of a week's duration may have a salutary effect. It supplies the necessary warning that the people are reaching the limits of endurance, and any German statesman who possesses a strain of ordinary prudence will draw the inevitable conclusion and hasten peace—provided that the Allies are willing.

At this point, however, the question arises whether Trotzky and the Austro-German strikers have the same object in view. The strikers drew up a moderate programme, which included only peace, food, civil liberty and political reform. Trotzky aims at social revolution. He has got his battalions into marching order. He can control their movements far behind the German front. He has achieved in his war what the Allies sigh for in vain in theirs—unity of command. His orders run to Berlin and Vienna, to Hamburg and Budapest. There is in every country of Europe a potential element of response to these tactics. So far as this element has come under my own observation in England, it is not numerous or widely distributed, and it is only very slightly under the influence of the Bolshevik ideology. It is restive over the growing shortage of food, angry with the profiteers, hostile to the government, tired of work at high pressure, weary of the interminable war, suspicious of imperialistic aims, sick of the carnage, and anxious for the surviving lads. In short, it wants peace, but it is not thinking seriously of social revolution. So far as one can judge from German newspapers, that, too, is the mood there, intensified only by the fact that infinitely worse material conditions have been endured for very much longer. On this discontent and longing for peace Trotzky can play only so long as governments seem to be the obstacle to an honorable peace without annexations. What would happen, however, if these strikes were really to induce a chastened mood in the German negotiators at Brest? If Herr von Kühlmann were to offer a reasonable settlement, a compromise which really would secure national freedom but not a social revolution in the border provinces, dare Trotzky refuse it?

The dilemma, if it should present itself, would be puzzling. " If I make peace," Trotzky might say, " on these terms, reasonable as they are from the bourgeois point of view, I shall have on

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Russia's frontiers a ring of middle-class states. I shall lose the chance of exploiting German discontent, and the movement which is now turning, albeit very slowly, in a revolutionary direction in Germany itself, will be arrested. A general peace will follow, a middle-class peace, and then within a few months, the whole force of capitalist Europe will be used to overthrow the Russian revolution. If, on the other hand, I stand out for the maximum, reject any compromise, and refuse what the average man would consider, in all the circumstances, an honorable peace, can I count on the continued support of the German masses? Will men who are merely war-weary continue to struggle for an ideal end? Will even the Russian masses who have got the land and now want peace to till it, endure the privations which a revolutionary strategy requires? If the masses have to choose between peace today and a world revolution on the day after tomorrow, will they not certainly vote for peace?"

It is probable that the dilemma will never present itself so sharply as this. On the one hand, the German government will probably equivocate to the end, and will not offer the Russians a peace which honorable men could accept. On the other hand, Trotzky and Lenine may be bluffing much more than I believe is the case. Their apparent madness is perfectly methodical. For the moment they feel fairly safe. A German offensive into Russia must wait for the good weather of April, and meanwhile strikes may be repeated. The Bolsheviki are playing not merely for power, still less for peace, but for the social revolution, and their premise that a revolutionary Russia surrounded by hostile bourgeois states would never be safe, has shrewd insight behind it. Is there a way out of the difficulty? I doubt whether there is. The belief of the true doctrinaire, that the capitalist world will always, in one way or another, scheme to destroy the first state which adopts Socialism, is probably ineradicable. For my part, I think it well founded. One seems to be on the verge of one of those really inevitable disasters which make the tragedy of history. If Pitt and Grenville had treated Chauvelin politely in 1792, the war might not have broken out in the first months of 1793, but for how long could it have been delayed? If the Allied military authority had not interned Trotzky in Halifax, our relations with Bolshevik Russia might be somewhat easier.

It is easy to say that we need only promise not to interfere with Russia, but what is to happen if she, on her side, proceeds to carry the revolutionary war into Rumania, as Dumouriez carried it into Holland? None the less, it is a hopeless statesman who sits down to contemplate the inevitable. There are two mutually dependent policies to follow. One of them is that policy of active helpfulness to Russia, which President Wilson indicated in that last great message which has made him more than ever the leader and inspirer of all who dare to hope for the world. If help is given without conditions and without patronage, it may break down in some degree the fatalistic Bolshevik belief that socialist Russia, unless she can first revolutionize Europe, is doomed to be the victim of Europe. But help is is not enough, and help may be rebuffed. Unless the Bolsheviki see the socialist parties of Europe strong enough, and united enough, to stop any future movement to crush the Russian revolution, they will not feel secure, and they will not desist from their aggressive policy. So long as they think that the destinies of Europe are in the uncontrolled hands of liberal-conservative statesmen who are capable of uniting against them, they will continue to make unrest and will thwart any stable international organization. Talk to them of a League of Nations (which means for them a league of hostile governments) and they will ask, why was it that the delegates of the masses were forbidden to meet at Stockholm? It may be impossible to reconcile the liberal ideal of peace with this new portent of a revolutionary peace. The delays, the insincerities, the contradictory aims have unleashed forces which may now be beyond control. There is one expedient which even now it may not be too late to apply. Let all the socialist parties meet in international conference; let them dissipate the detestable Machiavellian idea that the west should buy safety by throwing Russia to the Junker wolves; let them work out the bases of a democratic peace of reconciliation; let them offer it to Russia as a gift which comes from those whom she can trust.

H. N. Brailsford.

London.

# God, The Invisible King

This is the Age of Water. Toll sad bells,
The fiery faiths are dead without regret.
Jesus and Pan are slain by H. G. Wells;
Well-thought-out Faith is here ($1.50 net).
Forget the fierce, the epic, bitter-sweet
Things that we loved though they were false or true;
Shatter the white gods with the wingéd feet,
Contemn those who in Hebron wore the rue.
Henceforth by casuistry must we live,
(Each system dying with each casuist)
Our instincts to the Social Thinkers give,
Our passions to the psycho-analyst.
By "earnest-minded men" shall we be led,
Who show elaborately The Host is bread!

David Gordon.

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# Petrograd

A CITY reared with curses and resting its foundations upon the bones of its nameless builders. A stately giant sunk knee-deep in the mire of a Finnish fen. The magnificent and fruitful whim of the most brutal of rulers, who nearly rode the Russian horse to death. A cross between a muddy dock-yard and an unassuming parody on Potsdam. A mongrel seaport promoted to the rank of a world capital.

Granite, stern and sumptuous. Cast-iron. Ever veiled, joyless skies. Spacious, gloomy vistas. Austere architectural forms, broken by airy spires and flame-like church domes. An air of snobbishness and cold reserve. Sickly gardens. Bridges. Red palaces haunted by time-scented memories of much gaiety and many crimes. Morose governmental offices, the hatching-place of the Byzantine-Pomeranian statehood whose strait-jacket Russia wore two hundred years.

A challenge to Russia and yet profoundly Russian: twin-souled, twin-tongued. The home of bureaucrats and regicides, of uniformed minds and souls naked of all inner restraint. The city on whose pavements the blood of the firstlings of Russian freedom, the Decembrists, is mixed with the blood of an Emperor of all the Russias. The brain of Russia, divided by the noiseless waves of the Neva into two hemispheres. The worshipper of clarity and reason. The city of Pushkin's serene muse. But also the City Phantasmal, the city of Dostoevsky. Its yellow mists and its white nights, sated with mystic light, are heavy with apocalyptic visionings.

The midwife and the grave-digger of a great and tragic revolution. The City of Revolt. The Quartier St. Antoine of Slavdom, feeding on resolutions and led by Don Quixotes, energumens, and demagogues. The storm centre of immemorial animosities and new loyalties. The cradle of an abortive gospel of active proletarianism and universalism, denying Old Russia and yet voicing some of its innermost yearnings and hopes. The work-shop of a new dogmatism. A confused symphony in which the outcries of the triumphant Caliban mingle with hosannas never heard before and the death-rattle of a nation. Half Babylon, half Nazareth.

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Darkness is swooping down on the heart of the great city. The hour draws near. The enemy is at the gates. If fall he must, the blinded giant will not be the only one to die. The embers from his funeral pile will set the conqueror's dwellings on fire and kindle the standing corn of his fields.

ABRAHAM YARMOLINSKY.

# The Legal Status of War

SUPPOSE the world at peace. Abruptly Germany declares war upon France and invades her territories without even disguising the intention of annexation or even of reducing her neighbor to vassalage. What happens legally? What happens, that is as far as international law is concerned? Or, if this question seems to be framed on the basis of the present hatred of Germany, ask a similar question about an unjustified attack by the United States upon Mexico or Canada. The resulting legal situation is in no uncertainty. Immediately the war comes under the sanction of international law. It is henceforth a "legal war." Other nations are as much bound to neutrality and the observance of the rules laid down by international law as if the war were a benign enterprise.

Most discussions concerning war ignore this primary fact, namely, that the civilized world puts all wars, as soon as they are initiated, upon the same plane of legality, without any regard to their origin and objectives. The present legal situation is summed up in the definition given by Charles Sumner:

> War is a contest between nations under the *sanction of international law* for the establishment of justice between them.

It is this fact which ties the hands of those who desire a permanent improvement in international relations. If it is lawful to do a thing, why make such a cry about its being done? If war is legal, why object to militarism, which is a necessary effect of the legality of war rather than, as is popularly assumed, the cause of war? If war is legitimate it inevitably follows that those extensive and chronic preparations for war which constitute militarism are as practically sensible as they are legally justified. As long as international law continues to legalize war all nations are moral accessories before the fact to "collective murder." Conversely, outlaw war and militarism is out of a job.

It may be contended that although these statements have applied in the past they will not hold good if the League to Enforce Peace comes into existence. But however radical the plan for the formation of such a League may have seemed before the war, a fundamental defect is now obvious. It does not propose to declare war illegal; it proposes simply to refine those regulations under which war is legal: To increase the preliminary ceremonies which must be gone through in order that the benediction of legality may descend upon a war. So far so good. But as long as nations are educated to think of war as a legalized institution the distinction made by the League between

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"justiciable" and "non-justiciable" might utterly defeat the main purpose of the League. The distinction invites manipulation at the hands of astute statesmen with aggrandizing tendencies. What more could a Bismarck or a Disraeli desire than exclusion from the forceful jurisdiction of the supreme Tribunal of all causes involving "national honor" and "vital national interests"? The non-justiciable exception would be an open bid for skilled manoeuvering. Would not the assassination of the crown prince at Sarajevo have supplied a non-justiciable issue through which to usher in the present world war? The matters which reasonably constitute points of vital interest and honor to the respective nations are precisely the matters to be formulated and safeguarded in the proposed International Code. These large questions would then be fought out by experienced statesmen in the council chamber rather than by boys on the field of battle.

In the history of English law after the establishment of a right to trial and evidence before a court, private murderous brawls (though doubtless reduced in number) continued under the guise of "affairs of honor." From the time of Henry II down to the nineteenth century any private dispute might have two aspects: One a mundane, material aspect relating to property rights and as such justiciable—i. e., capable of determination upon evidence by a court; the other affecting the character, not the property, of the injured party, and hence non-justiciable, i. e., capable of settlement not by a court upon evidence, but only by a murderous conflict called a duel. Since either alternative was lawful, it was open to any skilled bully to emphasize the honor or prestige element in a dispute, turn his back upon the courts, and, in full exercise of his legal rights, insist upon a settlement on "the field of honor."

In fact, the whole history of the duel closely parallels the course of international law with respect to war. For centuries efforts were made in most countries to moderate and regulate dueling by "Codes," fixing the terms and conditions, weapons, distance, duties of seconds, etc., etc. The code became more and more elaborate; more and more "humane." Seconds were morally bound to act as a "council of conciliation." But the whole thing rested on the premise of the legality of dueling. It assumed affairs of honor in which it was the obligation as well as the right of a gentleman to resort to the shedding of blood. An interesting volume might be written comparing the code of honor between individuals with that called international law between nations, the Hague Conventions occupying the place of culminating futility in the latter. In one case as the other, we want not laws *of* war, but laws *against* war, just as we have laws *against* murder, not laws *of* murder. Perhaps three-fourths of the contents of treatises on international law are devoted to rules and regulation of war.

On this subject Woolsey says:

> International law assumes that there must be wars and fighting among nations and endeavors to lay down rules by which they shall be brought within the limit of justice and humanity. In fact, wars and the relations in which nations stand to one another as belligerent or neutral, form the principal branch of international law, so much so, that in a state of assured and permanent peace there would be little need of this science.

The quotation enforces the similarity between international law and the old dueling codes. Both are intended simply to set certain limits within which a perfectly legal practice shall go on. The aim of both is simply to mitigate and humanize. Upon the whole the advantage is on the side of the dueling codes; for at least they were enforceable; while, as the present war shows, it is quite possible for any nation which is ruthlessly bent upon victory to ignore under the pleas of self-preservation, military necessity, or *lex talionis*, any provision which it finds in its way. As long as war is the lawful method of establishing justice between nations there seems indeed to be something incongruous in the notion of war plus rose-water, and much to be said for the logic, though not the morality, of a nation which, like Germany, carries the idea of war to its extreme conclusion as a legitimate science.

The outlawing of war is manifestly the primary condition under which the League to Enforce Peace can be made effective. If war is to remain lawful, its antecedent, military preparation, is legitimate and necessary; if war is made criminal international force is required for prevention and punishment. The power to enforce any law must always be adequate. A trial before an international court must not be an alternative to war; it must be made a substantial and complete substitute for war. We must not indulge in the absurdity of committing ourselves to the proposition that we may use force to compel a nation to submit its cause to arbitration, but shall not use force to execute the decision of the international court in such arbitration.

War, though made illegal, might still conceivably occur but it would be branded as a crime and the force of the world would be organized to deal with the criminal. Without these safeguards reduction of armaments would only too probably be a mere temporary expedient during economic convalescence, to be later evaded under one pretext or another when some nation thought that its inter-

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ests would be furthered by resorting to war.

With these safeguards, reduction of armaments would occur as a matter of course to the point required to protect domestic tranquillity and other intra-national needs. In course of time the very existence of a tribunal where all international wrongs may be redressed would render the great force behind it protective and merely potential, like the force now behind our own national and state tribunals.

In closing I wish to say that I write from the standpoint of a lawyer, although not an international lawyer. My experience has been largely in dealing with problems arising from conflicts of interests due to industrial breakdowns and a consequent need for reorganization. It has convinced me that the problem of adjusting large conflicting corporate interests is not essentially different as a human problem from that of the adjustment of conflicting national interests. At present, however, the practical application of such a point of view to international affairs is hampered and at critical moments made impossible by the survival of the old tradition of the legality and necessity of war. When war is released from the embrace of international law, then and then only can sensible methods of adjustment be resorted to with adequate promise of success. Moreover, the elimination of war would automatically sweep away most of the present vexing international questions. The problems of contraband, blockade, in short the freedom of the seas, buffer states, the so-called balance of power, the sanctity of neutrality treaties, integrity of small nations, the "rectification of boundaries," are created by the existence of war and have no significance under peace conditions.

To sum up, two things are indispensable to the reorganization of the world: The specific outlawing of war by the code of nations and the ability by force to execute the decrees of the international tribunal.

S. O. LEVINSON.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## The African Riddle (An Essential Preliminary)

SIR: Mr. Wells aptly terms it the African Riddle and offers no concrete programme beyond suggesting some sort of international control of the dark continent after the war. Yet even this first step, so obviously desirable for the future peace of the war, presents difficulties.

The purpose of such international control, while incidentally assuring all nations equal economic opportunity in Africa, would be to secure for its undeveloped peoples freedom from selfish exploitation, until such time when the principle of self-determination may fairly be applied to them. The success of an undertaking of such magnitude, the guidance of one hundred and fifty million souls, would depend almost entirely on the character and personnel of the international commission entrusted with this great task. Now any such control presupposes the general acceptance by all nations of the Wilsonian definition of democracy which is today practically axiomatic throughout the world save in Germany and the dwindling imperialist groups in Entente countries. Because of the President's magnificent vitalization of democratic principles, American leadership may well be expected to continue and enlarge in any future system of international control. Particularly would this seem indicated in regard to Africa, where the United States of all great nations is most palpably without selfish designs.

But would our leadership be adequate in the case of Africa? Would the consensus of intelligent "colored" opinion, in whatever lands it may be found, acclaim such leadership for the mother continent? Indeed, could any Americans, sincerely eager to have democratic principles applied to all the world and all its races, conscientiously approve American leadership there?

Pitiless national self-scrutiny (a wholesome process just now) reveals the handling of our race problem, with its industrial and social ostracism, its burnings at the stake, its unpunished peace-time massacres, as the supreme anachronism of civilization. While preaching self-determination of peoples, we have violated the integrity of a weak neighbor, Hayti, for one hundred and fifteen years a republic, where despite revolutions and political upheavals no American woman was ever molested, no American citizen slain. And already some of the advance guard of our democracy, wearing its uniform, have "made scenes" in Paris cafés because French colored troops were served there.

But here is the vital point. The failure of our democracy in this one respect does not invalidate the principles for which we contend—the less so if we recognize our paradoxical weakness and forbid its extension elsewhere.

Granting American failure in respect to the darker races, whose leadership remains? Not that of Belgium, herself the unhappy victim of barbarism, haunted by the mutilated children of the Congo. Not Germany, stained with Von Trotha's infamous massacres in West Africa. Not Italy, with the memories of her attempt on Abyssinian sovereignty still green. England? Yes, perhaps, although her own Indian problem is still unsettled, and because, further, any enlargement of her territorial influences would surely be viewed in many quarters with disfavor.

There remains France, whose treatment of her colored Colonials is the shining light in the history of black and white racial contact. There are the innately democratic peoples of Scandinavia whose remoteness from the problem has kept them unaware of the subtleties of Jim-Crow democracy. Finally there are the South American republics where color counts little and "a man's a man for a' that."

Before trying to solve Africa's problem it will be necessary to determine not only whether its races are fit for self-government, but which of the civilized nationalities are qualified to act as its preceptors. Officially the United States is least so—just as old Russia would have been unfit

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for a similar role in respect to a Zionist Palestine—though we have in this country a few real democrats, individuals like Moorfield Storey and Oswald Garrison Villard, whose democracy has stood the acid test of applicability to all races.

Washington. ERNEST H. GRUENING.

## Lloyd George's Position

[Note: The following letter has been received from a friend in England.]

THERE is no doubt that since his meeting with the Trade Union Congress on January 5th, Lloyd George has strengthened his position; but on the whole he has done it by moving away from certain members of his own Cabinet and thereby creating a certain defect of instability in his immediate surroundings. Generally speaking his ministry has not fulfilled the expectations entertained of it a year ago and the general disappointment with military operations in 1917 will react heavily against his prestige unless he can show the country that he is prepared to seek merit wherever it may be found. This applies especially to the controversy at present raging between him and the High Command in France, in which there are two elements. Firstly, a considerable section of the London press, supported by a powerful but rather thoughtless body of public opinion, asks for wider powers for the military authorities and in some cases scarcely conceals its desire for a military dictatorship. The argument in favor of this course is conducted along the former lines of contempt for civilian control and an independent belief in the statesmanship of the simple soldier in time of war. Secondly, the apologists of the Commander-in-Chief declare that the politicians at home (i.e., the War Cabinet) have interfered with military plans to the extent of depriving the Commander-in-Chief of his initiative and thus upsetting his whole strategic conception for 1917. There is a little truth in this statement but not enough to justify the demand for unlimited military control. Indeed there is a widespread feeling in the country that Haig's tactics of hammering on the western front are too expensive; that he has had a long period in which to show whether his plan of operations could lead to victory, and that the War Cabinet ought to adopt the well known Napoleonic practice of dismissing generals who did not prove worth their salt. In view of the meagre information which we receive it is difficult to judge between these conflicting parties. But my whole instinct bids me back the War Cabinet against the High Command, mainly because I think that Sir Douglas Haig has had ample time (nearly two years now) in which to justify his conceptions, and that as we have neither unlimited time nor unlimited reserves at our disposal we cannot continue to pursue military tactics on the western front which, while desperately expensive in certain cases, have produced no corresponding result.

It is most regrettable that these subjects have become the object of newspaper controversy. This is entirely the fault of the War Cabinet. They have never had the courage to take instant action with the result that their power to act independently of clamor and prejudice is waning and they may soon find themselves in a position in which the military command will be stronger than they. That would be a deplorable result especially with reference to the political objects of the war, for it would tend to discourage the rapidly rising liberal view of peace terms and correspondingly to encourage organs like the Morning Post.

Those who demand a military dictatorship do so in the secret hope that the new Cromwell would so organize the country as to destroy the unruly spirit which is now at work in the ranks of labor. For myself, I regard that spirit as one of the best hopes for a sound peace. The working classes have definitely made up their minds that this is to be the last war (we need not stop to enquire for the moment whether this is an illusion or not) and they will stop short at nothing in order to remove from power, at the appropriate moment, those whom they suspect of holding militarist opinions. We are not going to have a revolution: but we may have something very like it, for opinion is ripening very fast and will drive both the House of Commons and the government still further towards democratic terms of peace than the point which Lloyd George reached in his speech of January 5th. His declaration was admirable; but it had two serious weaknesses. Firstly, that unlike President Wilson he appeared incapable of understanding Russia, and secondly, that his references to a League of Peace were perfunctory and half-hearted. But he is developing in the right direction and I think under the growing democratic pressure in this country he will maintain and develop the promise contained in that speech. President Wilson, however, has now assumed the leadership of the liberal forces of the world, mainly because he has shown all thinking men that his acts are preceded by the most careful preparation and study.

## Robert Hoxie

SIR: I have just read the review of trade unionism in the United States, appearing in the January 12th issue of the New Republic, and I am taking the liberty of writing to you because of the reasons you give for the mature and complete nature of this posthumous work. I know that there was, in addition to the reasons which you give, another one which made it possible for Mrs. Hoxie and Nathan Fine to prepare the material which has just been published in book form.

It was my rare privilege to have known Mr. Hoxie for a number of years, to have lectured on applied and trade union economics before his classes for ten years, to have served with him on the commission which investigated the relationship of scientific management to labor, and to have enjoyed the most intimate of friendly relations. His death was the most severe blow I have suffered in life, for, in several respects, he was more to me than any other man with whom I have become acquainted.

It had been Hoxie's intention to publish a book which would be the most thorough examination, analysis and interpretation of the trade-union movement. It was to be his one book. He frequently expressed the opinion to me that the economists, particularly those dealing with the industrial problems, were not justified in writing many books because there were so many angles to be considered, and sympathetic tendencies or environments so strongly tend to color what is seen, that it was only in the mature years of a man's life that he should undertake to gather together in one book the information which he felt would be of value to his fellowmen.

Some fifteen years ago Hoxie determined to prepare the material for this one book. It was his intention to

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supplement his university work with as much field work as could be done and then when his mind had fully matured, which he thought would be about the fifty-fifth year, he would lay aside all of his work and devote the remaining ten years to the preparation of his book. He believed that few minds were matured enough to undertake such a task before the fifty-fifth year, and that several years would be required after the rough plan of the book had been prepared to work it into that perfect book which was his ideal. It is my opinion that it was this fixed intention of his which gave that apparent continuity to his notes which is shown in the book.

Hoxie was a genius, unfortunately super-sensitive, with an ambition for work altogether too great for the vitality at his command. He believed that the greatest benefit he could confer was to discover the truth and exhibit it so that it could not help but be recognized. He had remarkable powers for minute and accurate analysis so far as men and motives were concerned. He was most unbiased and yet was continually inventing checks upon himself to prevent any sympathy, which he imagined he might have, from blinding him to the actual facts. If a certain industrial condition was termed red, for illustration's sake, he would first want to prove that red was the color, and then, with an indominable energy he would attack the task of discovering the exact shade of red which indicated the condition he was examining.

This country suffered a tremendous loss in his unfortunate death and the fact that his book was never written.

JOHN P. FREY.

Cincinnati, Ohio.

## A Labor College

SIR: Among the many discussions of the remarkable pronouncement made by the British Labor party I have failed to see any reference to certain influences which have had a part in bringing about this programme. In the early days of the war, at the request of labor men, Sidney Webb and Arnold Freeman published a handbook which was used throughout the kingdom by local labor unions as a guide in planning the reconstruction of their own local governments and unions in the days immediately following the war.

It is many years since two Americans were among the chief instruments in establishing Ruskin College for laboring men at Oxford. One of these agents was the man who has recently done conspicuous pioneer service in an American university—Charles A. Beard. In this institution have been gathered men sent for a few months or a year by their unions to become trained to serve on local school boards and as union officers. I recall Jane Addams at the time she was serving as chairman of a stormy committee of the Chicago school board dryly remarking, in connection with this British undertaking: "Imagine any one in America thinking it necessary to learn anything at all in order to serve on a school board!"

When the work of this college was discussed with Andrew D. White at Cornell he told of plans he had drawn up many years ago for the establishment of a similar labor college in connection with an American university.

The Rand School is doing valuable training service, and reports of proceedings in connection with the North Dakota legislature recognize this idea. It may be well for our further profit to make acknowledgment at this time of the part played by these forces in one of the world's most progressive situations.

FRANK A. MANNY.

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

## Aliens by Marriage

SIR: Can you help me to understand why a woman born, bred and residing in the United States, because she marries an alien, ceases to be an American and becomes an alien right in her very home town at that?

Why should a foreign-born man become an American just because of a naturalization paper and an American-born woman become an alien just because of a foreign-born husband? Which is more truly an American—the native-born, who loves her country, or the foreign-born, who loves its gold?

Is there common sense, justice and democracy (the pet ideal of the moment) that compels an American-born woman to be governed by the will of foreign-born American men and women whose very language and ideals are sometimes alien to the U. S. A.?

A. R. L.

## Our Good and Bad Points

SIR: Perhaps the following may possibly interest you, at least it is the reason wherefore I am still on your subscription list.

The literary side of your valuable publication is what I have reference to, particularly your remarkable book reviews. You seem so much at home in them, and you make them so human, [illegible]w, that I simply had to take your magazine—crazy political opinions, disgusting socialism and all—for those wonderful reviews. Gissing's By the Ionian Sea, for example, nearly brought the very tears into my eyes, the way you reviewed that book.

Always I look forward to them, and really I think you must too, those remarkable digests you make of a great human book such as your last one—Recollections, by John Morley, or Chekov, etc.

I should think you would look forward to reviewing your books a long time in advance.

The remainder of your publication should be suppressed.

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## Didactic Omniscience

SIR: I concur with Mr. C. L. Vestal in his letter in issue of February 9th in criticizing your recent articles about the war administration and I add, by the way, the attitude of omniscience on most subjects, and the didactic manner of expressing your own often valuable suggestions of the way to do things. In these two respects they are to my mind too much like the New York Evening Post, which I alternately damn and cheer.

I may add that while I usually send my copies, when read, to the army cantonments, yet I have felt that several recent numbers were not desirable reading for our soldiers and so have burnt them up.

R. M. ATWATER.

Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania.

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# Metrical and Diametrical

## War.—Christmas

Thy mouth so wide! Thy fangs so cruel!
Thy jaws so strong! Thy maw capacious!
So deep within! Thou Moloch spacious!
What direful curse provides thy fuel?

Thy mouth so wide! Thy breath so pestful!
Thy jaws so strong, men's bones are crushing,
Hearts' blood, souls' tears, adown thee rushing,—
Of new-born woes, Thou has a nest-ful.

Oh fire of hell—Thy mouth its portal—
Thy jaws so strong that rim its crater—
Turn Monster, Turn! Behold thy Greater
Comes with God's Peace—Earth's King Immortal.

T. G. Steward.

## No Status Ante Quo

Oh Comrades, heed the ringing cry
The Strong hurl at the foe,
The end for which our millions die:
No status ante quo.

Above the cannons' blinding roar
Comes Hope's soft radiant glow
To ease the weary weight of war,
No status ante quo.

Oh, hug that promise to your breast,
Great soul of womankind;
And with it spur your flagging zest,
Ye workers, till now blind.

For 'tis but we who understand
The words a whole world sees.
Their meaning is not writ in land,
In ships or colonies.

Hear! We from whom the guns and mines
Take legs and eyes and sobs,
Will not return in humble lines
To struggle for scant jobs.

We want no world of sodden pain,
Like that we used to know.
We do not want to die in vain!
No status ante quo!

We do not want our boys to work
Till god-man turns to beast,
So that the bloated few may shirk
And still sit at the feast.

We do not want our girls' despair
To sell them to men's lust,
To get the price of stingy fare
By groveling in the dust.

We do not want our babies' lives
Dwarfed in their mothers' wombs,
Because to get our bread, our wives
Must work in earthly tombs.

Oh, we who bleed and we who die
Must banish all such woe.
So echo loud the joyous cry:
No status ante quo!

Sylvia B. Kopald.

## Impartial Nature

Court Nature in her higher manifestations
And she will gladly honor and choose you
As her friend. Each day she does her earth bedew,—
Even the sandy, parched, Sahara. Her sons
Need not fear that she will them forget though tons
Of ingratitude they may have shown to her. No few
Has she for favorites: none will she eschew
If they but obey her laws. Only him who runs
Away from her does she resent. But no pity
Does she know, no love but through her laws. Interpret
Her aright and you are one of the blest of earth. No
nation
Is her favorite,—she only honors the tie
Of obedience; no potentate has she set
Upon a throne; she has no favorite son.

John Collins Welch.

## Tribute to Pres. Wilson's Address of Feb. 11, 1918

President Wilson—great leader of man—
You spokesman of honor, of justice and truth!
Who dare to oppose you; who will, or who can
Stop such precious words from bearing their fruit?

What being, with natural human conceptions—
Can escape the effect of such words?
What evil ambitions can become interceptions,
To the infinite sway of such swords?

How deeply did pierce, your expressions sublime,
The Pacifist, Fighter, and Foe!
You conquered them all at the very same time,
Creating ardor, fire, and awe!

With phrases so lofty, so gentle, so pure—
You won all the haters of blood;
You showed what the world is apt to endure,
If we don't impede the Attilean flood!

Such words are as drops of incentive on fire—
To inflame fighting spirit in youth!
Who can not hear world's call from the mire,
To the champions for freedom and truth?

With forces divine you unmasked the aggressor,
The Cæsarian, Junker Kultur!
To the German masses, you showed their oppressor,
The cause of the pains they endure!

I almost can hear the great avalanche rolling—
Crushing, destroying all things in its way;
Oh; What a thunder! The Kaiser is falling!
Junkerdom perished in the rise of the day!

S. H. Basson.

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# After the Play

WHAT prescription did Rudolf Besier and Sybil Spottiswoode try to fill when they made up Her Country, the anti-German propagandist play now being given at the Punch and Judy, New York.

Something like this, my guess would be: We all know how Germany, Prussia-ridden Germany, has acted since August, 1914. From this we infer what Prussia, before August, 1914, must have been like. Let us dip into our memories and take what will give the strongest support to this inference. Let us take nothing whatever that tends in the slightest degree to contradict or mitigate this inference. Let us serve quiet, good-humored, unrhetorical, with ridicule, guaranteed both free from the madder forms of Hun-hate and also thoroughly anti-German.

So much for Mr. Besier's and Miss Spottiswoode's formula. What do they show in their finished product?

They show us the experiences of Margaret Tinworth—a young American in the Punch and Judy version, a young Englishwoman, I suppose, in the play's original form—at a small Prussian provincial town. We see her first engaged to Kurt Hartling, a Prussian lieutenant, then married to him, then breaking with him and departing for Her Country.

They show us certain Prussian things, certain traits in the Prussian military character. Such as:

An arrogance too hard to be called self-complacency, too consciously methodical to be called pride. Servility to your superiors in the hierarchy, to everybody who can make or spoil your career. Brutality to everybody below you, to everybody in your power, especially to women in your power, especially to the woman most in your power, your wife. Prussian manners, dress, furniture, way of living, Prussian relations of the Prussian sexes, Prussian taste in pictures, food, drink—we see them all in Her Country, and none of them is good.

Miss Spottiswoode's and Mr. Besier's attack upon Prussia is not, however, so crude as this account of it would lead one to suppose. Their drive is not so much against things Prussian, not quite so much, as against the Prussian conceit which deems these things incomparably the best in the world, against the determination of the Prussian to be taken everywhere at his own valuation, and to impose his standards and his preferences upon all mankind. The Prussian officer is conceited, and his education is a cultivation of conceit. He idolizes himself as part of the German will, as an instrument of German destiny, and this form of self-idolatry is taught him as a duty. He is lustful, and one of his motives for doing as lust bids him is an almost mystical faith that Germans are and ought to be more "virile" than other men.

Of the dramatists whom the New Theatre made us acquainted with, it must be eight or nine years ago now, none interested me more than Mr. Besier. His was indeed a pleasant talent. He evidently enjoyed placing himself at many points of view. He could represent opposed wills with sympathy, with fairness, with imagination. In Don he was flexible and humane.

Before the war Mr. Besier would not have thought, I feel certain, of collaborating in such a tendency-play as Her Country, such a bit of mere propaganda. The notion of writing it would not have occurred to him, he would have declined to take part in such an enterprise had any collaborator proposed it, the writing of such a play would have bored him about as much as seeing it would have bored me, before the war.

But were I to say this, and no more, I should be blind to the differences between Her Country and all the plays of which to call them propaganda would be to give a nearly complete account. True, the war has altered this playwright, and for the worse. But he remains a man with brains, he is still something of an artist.

For example, although he and Miss Spottiswoode are patriotic, they are not rhetorical patriots. They do not lavish praise on her country, their heroine's. They do not exalt one country at the expense of all other countries. They exalt all countries except Germany at Germany's expense. They are pro-ally, not chauvinist.

Although they are writing as propagandists, although they aim to justify our detestations and abhorrences, and to make these converge, their method is not the cumulation of ruthless act upon ruthless act, of frightfulness upon frightfulness. On their stage no atrocity is committed, we see the effects of none, none is planned. Most of their events, and all that count in their indictment, take place before the war. The scenes which occur after the war has started are both the least systematically anti-German and also the quietest in their play. When the young wife tells her Prussian lieutenant husband that their break is absolute, final, never to be mended, she does not triumph or gloat over him. She remembers that she loved him not long ago. Her feeling is one of relief and escape. So was mine.

But mine was not only pleasure at her and my escape from the thick Prussian atmosphere in which we had been living. I was glad to escape from the Punch and Judy into a world of surprising contradictions and conflicting evidence.

In the play itself there was no conflicting evidence, nothing contradictory enough. Able attorneys for the prosecution, Miss Spottiswoode and Mr. Besier. The Prussian military state of mind, as they show it to us in time of peace, and show it without a word of explicit prophecy, is a soil from which, in time of war, the crop of ruthlessness and frightfulness would inevitably be large. Very likely they have put into their play no incident and no character which a man who has lived in Prussia could not find a match for in his recollections. I should not be surprised to hear, and I should not have difficulty in believing, that Her Country is founded on fact.

But the facts have been too manifestly picked for the good of the cause. The artist is known by what he omits. Granted. But so is the propagandist. Their omissions differ widely in purpose and effect. In Miss Spottiswoode's and Mr. Besier's Prussia at peace there is no dissident minority, nobody who dislikes or laughs at his neighbors, no reader of Simplicissimus. The population consists exclusively of bullying militarists and their abject slaves. By omitting everybody else they have given their play a monotony of hostile purpose. Her Country has negative merits, workmanlike merits, it is good-humored, it keeps going, it has few dead spots, but it is too unrelieved to seem life-like. I came away feeling that I cared to stay neither in the same world with a victorious Prussia nor in a theatre which tried so hard to make me feel that Prussia must not be victorious.

Prussia is at peace as Prussia does at war. That is the formula for Her Country. It is too simple a formula. Life is not so simple as this formula, not so monotonous as this play. Compared with a propagandist work of art, like the Colette Baudoche of Maurice Barrès, Her Country is written by a heavy hand.

Q. K.

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# Straight from Life

*The Land Where the Sunsets Go, Sketches of the American Desert, by Orville H. Leonard. Boston: Sherman, French & Co. $1.35.*

IT is poor recommendation of a writer, as a rule, to say that he gets his material "straight from life." Occasionally a Conrad discovers that he has the power to reconstitute in words the type of drama that he has experienced. It is an accident. Usually the man of experience is just as handicapped in trying to communicate what he has seen and felt through the medium of writing as he would be if he tried to re-enact his experience on the stage. What he does, in the medium of writing, is to be monstrously gauche, to lay on artificial color as if he had never seen real color, to turn drama into melodrama and feeling into moonstruck sentiment, to ply awkwardly and woundingly the unfamiliar instruments of a trade. When a Marie-Claire lays aside her sewing-needle to tell with perfect taste and simplicity the touching story of her life, it looks as if any seamstress who was not misdirected could be equally "natural," equally eloquent of her patient human endurance and her bitter bread. But this is reserved for the seamstress who is also, by fortune, an artist. The person of experience may quickly see how weedy, how thin-blooded, is the representation applauded by literary people. The fact remains that the medium must be understood if the thick, rich reality is to come through.

In some respects Mr. Orville Leonard's sketches of the American Desert have an excessive amount of that "naturalness" which is the equivalent of original sin. Like an inexperienced golfer, he lunges forward to grasp the moon which he desires. He slogs when he should swing, he presses when he should defy temperament and be rhythmic, he lifts his eye to his goal and sacrifices his virtuous balance. But when this is said, when certain long-winded preambles are criticized and certain soulful descriptions of nature are called indigestible, the real wealth of this Desert book has to be professed. It is not only straight from life, it brings life with it, color and warmth and breath. Whatever sententiousness there is, the book's naked sincerity makes it seem insignificant. What pours through is the western sun and wind. In giving himself with whole heart to the Desert life, lonely and hard, spacious and immemorial, Mr. Leonard has created for his reader the image of that which he has loved, and he has peopled his desert with living creatures, human and animal. The sense of life, active and positive, with a distinct and pungent idiom, floats from Mr. Leonard's book like an aroma. He has his moments of banality, usually springing from his idea that the essence of drama is a knockout (such as ending a story, "his name is Karl Andersen, and he is a hopeless epileptic," or "and the rest is a story that is told—he will never see again," or "his right hand clutched an empty bottle—he had drunk his last bootleg"). But he has also his moments of deep-felt liberating description, his intense vividness as a story-teller of Desert Rats and skinners and miners and sheriffs; his high imaginativeness as to the experience of animals, the horse and the mule and the coyote; his easy fraternal humor and his embracing sympathy. An American portrait emerges from the book as a whole, one to which every sketch contributes, a portrait that deserves to be hung on the line.

Over sixty pieces go to the making of this book, nearly half of them jingles and verses. Mr. Leonard does not pretend that he is a poet. "Is my bronco's name Pegasus? Not by a damn sight! He bucks sometimes, but not so bad as *that*. He's just a little ornery son of a gun, an' his name's Will-o'-the-Wisp. I call him Bill for short." Tinsel as some of the verse is, there is poetry all through the book, especially in the human portraits. We are accustomed to carmine drawings by Jack London and Robert Service, the "elemental" theme all gingered up for ladies who live in steam-heated flats and never see any animal wilder than a cockroach. One great charm of Mr. Leonard is the mild benign air with which he sketches his Western men. Take these three snatches, the first of a mule "skinner," the next a squaw, the third of a candidate for sheriff.

The mule skinner: "His face is burned to a bright, brick red, his eyes are crinkled up from squinting into the desert sun, his hair is none too thick, but his mustache makes up for that, for he doesn't get time to shave. The tiny cigarette he smokes is buried in its shade. His voice is low and his speech is gentle when he is with his friends. No fiery words escape his lips, no oaths, nor any violence, save when he's skinning mules. Then he's a raging demon, and the vilest names he flings at them, blood curdling oaths and bitterest curses he hurls at their wagging ears."

The squaw: "With her smooth egg-shaped stone pestle poised in her sinewy brown hand, with the evening meal half mortared on the squaw rock where she sat, while her lord and master lolled beside a little twinkling fire, she gazed on the clear, soft western sky shading from rose up to the deepest azure, and the sharp silhouettes of branching trees, their limbs and leaves a graceful tracery stamped black against the dying light, gave birth in her primitive, misty brain to a delicate idea. With finest sinew, before the fire, she copied the dainty pattern she saw in the sunset glow.

"She was beaten next day by her irate man, for she had forgotten his dinner in copying nature's laciness.

"But art had advanced a step."

The candidate for sheriff: "'Howdy, Friend,' he drawled to me, in a pleasant, boyish voice, 'I reckon your filled up with sheriff, but I'm out to play the game with the rest. My name is Archie Hamilton, an' my friends just *made* me run. I never ain't did no politics, but I reckon I could try, an' I know the country from A to Z, an' all the hombres, too.' Then with a whimsical smile he added, as he looked at me, 'Maybe *that* ain't no recommend. . . .'

"He didn't offer me a cigar—for that he had my silent thanks—but sat on the bench beside my door, looking musingly down over cañon walls to the yellow desert far below.

"'Say, Pard, you're clost to Heaven here. Ain't this one o' God's own days!' Then with a self-amused chuckle at his own seriousness, 'My rivals all got the start o' me an' I got a great big job ahead, so I reckon I'll hit the trail. I hope our trails will cross in town, an' whether I'm sheriff or punchin' cows, I'll sure be glad to see you there.'

"With a firm handclasp and adios he was in his saddle and up the trail, riding along at a shuffling jog, rolling a cigareet.

"And I knew where *my* vote would go."

It is a pity that there is not space to quote some of the verse in which Mr. Leonard expresses the allurement of that sea of sand on whose shores he has lived and brooded. But without quotation one must be content to assert that The Land Where the Sunsets Go has in it a constant sincerity and simplicity of mood which makes it a volume

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especially worth reading. It is not often that the smooth tradesmanship of writing is varied by a fresh accent, telling of a new domestication of the spirit. Mr. Leonard has that accent, and for all his amateur conventionality at times, his possession of a clear personal experience is unquestionably "the real thing." Very often the trained writer tries to make his bricks without straw and wonders why he is criticized. Here is a writer who has material above criticism, handled with sufficient skill. Perhaps, after all, the gauche writers who are supposed to have had "experience" have only passed blindfold through the country of experience. The Desert, at any rate, has bloomed for the eyes of Mr. Leonard, and he has found words to tell his racy tale. F. H.

# A Labor Programme

*The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions, by Sidney Webb. New York: B. W. Huebsch. 50 cents.*

IT requires no profound insight at the present time to perceive that we are on the threshold of grave industrial change. The political and industrial supremacy of the middle classes has been challenged to produce its justification; and the patent dependence of political power upon economic control is being made strikingly evident at every stage of the governmental process. Yet the vagueness of our knowledge as to the nature of the crisis that is upon us is hardly less evident than the grim certainty of its presence. We seem, for the most part, almost curiously unable to realize that labor has determined, as in the great prophecy of Sieyes, to become everything in the state. This little pamphlet of Mr. Webb's is without exception the wisest and weightiest pronouncement on these issues that has come from an English publicist. It has all the patent virtues of Mr. Webb's work. It is at every point sober and cautious and amazingly well-informed. If it has a single defect, it is the absence from it of that willingness to take a leap in the dark by which the critics of Mr. Webb's school are at present courageously distinguished. It has, that is to say, the character that one would expect from the very finest type of governmental official. It has a certain blindness to the force of idealism, a tendency to distrust the largeness of a great programme, a willingness to accept facts as valid rather than to take them as the basis of transmutation. But it defines with remarkable clarity the central issues upon which the future of English labor depends; and it arouses in us the wonder whether, now that Robert Hoxie is dead, there is anyone in America who will be able to do for this country what Mr. Webb has so strikingly achieved for England. Yet it is upon the possession of the kind of knowledge that he has made available that our industrial future also must largely depend.

It is well known that in order to secure unrestricted output of munitions the British government obtained from the trade unions an agreement to the abrogation of their rules on condition of their immediate restoration at the close of war. Sealed by Act of Parliament, the credit of the British state is behind that pledge; and no one can mistake its purport who realizes that what was surrendered was virtually the profit of the bitter industrial war of the last hundred years. Labor confidence in the honesty of political life must inevitably depend in a high degree upon the way in which that pledge is fulfilled. The restoration agreed upon was absolute; and no one is so solemnly involved in its maintenance as the present Prime Minister. The point that Mr. Webb has to make is the apparent impossibility of carrying out that pledge. The war has brought about changes so vast as to make unthinkable a return to the pre-war status. The processes of manufacture have been revolutionized. New machinery has given unskilled and female labor a position in industrial life hitherto unknown. Piecework and bonus work have largely replaced the old time-wages. Productivity has been increased to an extent almost undreamed of before the war. Compulsory arbitration, compulsory ignoration of the kind of disputes which, before the war, seemed the very basis of the labor conflict have shifted the entire industrial perspective. What in fact is obvious is that new interests have been created of a magnitude so great that no government can afford to ignore them. Partially, at least, these interests are antithetic in their demands to the original pledge of restoration. It is clear that the task of reconciling such differences, especially when the new orientation of capital is borne in mind, is perhaps the most difficult problem by which British statesmanship is confronted.

Nor is it with a contented working class that the government will have to deal. No one who reads the recent report of the Trade Union Congress, or the eight reports of Mr. Lloyd George's very remarkable and courageous commission on industrial unrest, can have any doubts on that issue. What has everywhere been revealed is a declining faith in parliamentary government. What has been everywhere obvious is distrust in the policy of the government. What has been everywhere manifest is the desire of the workers to have in industrial life the power

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of control they theoretically possess in the world of politics. Broadly speaking, they are determined no longer to be satisfied with a state that is not primarily in their own hands. They have realized that the first stage to that end is the democratization of industry. The kind of ideas for which intellectuals like Mr. Cole and Mr. Orage, politicians like Mr. Lansbury, trade-unionists like Mr. Mann and Mr. Robert Williams, all alike stand are the only ideas that are making headway. The decision of the Labor party to open its ranks to every sympathizer is only a result of the goading criticism of that left wing. The determination of the cooperative movement to enter politics marks an epoch in the history of Great Britain; for it is the first attempt to project into the House of Commons the point of view of labor organized in its consumers' perspective. These are essentially an issuance of challenge to the middle class of Great Britain; and they clearly envisage for the next half century the same kind of struggle for England as is today evident in Russia. It is the acceptance of the class conflict, freed from the narrow rigidity in which Marx would have enshrouded it, as the basis of political life.

Such in broad terms, is the dilemma upon which the English state is advancing. On the one hand it may enforce its original pledge; and the consequence of its enforcement is certain to be serious disturbance. On the other hand, as a portion of the Tory press in London is already urging, it may well insist that to such a treaty as it made a rebus sic stantibus clause was impliedly attached; in such an event it is hardly doubtful that England will face a formidable revolution.

What Mr. Webb has done in this book is to suggest an equivalent for the original terms. He does not seek to conceal that their enforcement has become impossible. But he gravely emphasizes what must be the consequence of any attempt to exchange them for terms of lesser worth. He will have no sham restoration. So great a betrayal is, he urgently insists, simply an invitation to widespread disaster. It is a danger that has to be watched; for no one can doubt, if he has at all closely followed the industrial history of Great Britain in the last three years, that there are employers short-sighted enough to believe this possible. There cannot either be any compromise. Too much depends upon the attainment of full compensation to make half-measures satisfactory. Their folly will be obvious immediately they are translated into practical terms. They will result in industrial dislocation. They will do nothing to solve the vast problems of unorganized and female labor. They are bound to breed a temper of which the eventual outcome can only be violent readjustment. For it is essential to bear in mind that the whole faith of the worker in government will be involved in the settlement that is made; and the measure of its retention can be alone the measure of peace.

What Mr. Webb suggests is broadly this: Steps must be taken to prevent unemployment, and, to that end, he seems mainly to rely upon a programme of public works. The standard rate must be maintained; and it must be so fixed as at no point to fall below the minimum condition of civilized life. A constitution must be drawn up for factory and industry to include the universal acceptance of trade unionism; and the evolution of work-shop standards by the employer must be determined only after consultation with a representative committee of his men; nor must the idea of a constitution imply a restriction upon the union's right to strike. There must be no limitation of output; for not only is a high rate of productivity one of the fundamental needs of reconstruction, but the conditions which rendered it a necessary method of labor protection will have largely ceased to exist. The connection between such a programme and the Whitley report is obvious. How far removed it is from the faith in scientific management and welfare work which is beginning to percolate to the economists of English universities is hardly less clear. What needs to be emphasized is that this is for labor very certainly no more than a minimum programme. It will be used, and very frankly used, only as a stepping stone to that kind of industrial control which will transfer the centre of political importance from capital to labor. It is the avenue, that is to say, to a new state-synthesis. Only by bearing in mind the inherent probabilities of such a solution, and in their very broadest aspect, is it possible to visualize the future they involve.

An observer after the Napoleonic wars who had read such a solution would have dismissed it as frankly utopian; and one imagines that under the Six Acts Mr. Webb would have gone to prison. Today we can only read it with the sober certainty that, whatever the difference in detail, his large outline of the problem is beyond peradventure accurate. Whether English manufacturers will be persuaded to accept it, whether English statesmanship is bold enough to translate it into political terms, are problems where speculation is fruitless. This much only is certain, that whatever the attitude of capital and the British government, we have arrived at a new epoch. Nor is this less true of America. On all hands it is becoming evident that problems of hours and wages are only incidental to the main theme of industrial control. Upon the wisdom of American business men much is going to depend in the next generation. If they are realistic, if they understand that the old idea of labor is dead, the period of transition will be comparatively simple. But realism in the midst of turmoil is difficult to obtain. One can only hope that measures will be taken to give Mr. Webb's illuminating pamphlet the widest possible circulation; that is a task in which state labor departments and public libraries can usefully cooperate. It is only by the constant discussion of his theme that advancement can be made to a statement of our purposes. It is only by a full statement of our purposes that we can hope to avoid disaster.

H. J. L.

# Adventures in Miniature

*Persian Miniatures, by H. G. Dwight. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co. $3.00.*

ALTHOUGH Mr. Dwight tells of nothing that could be called a real adventure, he manages to give a charming air of adventurousness to his penetration of Persia and his winter at Hamadan. As unexplored country, Persia could not have for him the richness of the Turkey and the Stamboul Nights that he knows so well. But he cannot write without imparting his insatiable passion for the east and that imagination which leads his desire on towards Bokhara and Kum and Afghanistan and Kashmir and Tibet. The beautiful sketch of The Caravan, with which he closes this book, conveys all the "vague ancestral stirring of nostalgia" that comes to him from the passing of the mysterious camels with their jangling bells. So that, even if Mr. Dwight is candid enough to confess his fatigue

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


# A WORD FOR PROFITEERS

It has become almost fashionable to speak contemptuously about "business men." They have become as unpopular as hedgehogs at a picnic. But it is a cheap pastime to denounce all "business" men as Profiteers. Under the present profit system what business man is not obliged to make as much money as he legally can, or be forced to the wall by some competitor who has not such fine sensibilities? And which of you, so smug in your virtue, wouldn't rather eat pate de foi gras than file a schedule of liabilities?—which brings us to the real point of this discussion:

Can we be fair to ourselves in charging only 60c. for a hand-bound, limp, croft-leather volume in the Modern Library? When sixty cents was fixed as our selling price, the United States had not yet declared war against Germany. Since then, the prices of eggs, butter, pork, ice-cream sodas, beef, coal, cotton, talcum powder, wool, leather, newspapers, filet of sole Marguery, etc., etc., have advanced about 63 132-789%. Even the price of labor has greatly increased. Still there is more than a vague suspicion that the present startlingly high prices are not wholly justified by economic causes. Some zealous and righteous citizens even insist that there are more diamonds, automobiles, fur coats, and gilt edge securities being worn by a select few than ever before.

But listen to the other side of the question. The other day one of our friendly fellow publishers treated us to a four-course luncheon and gently suggested that we have a lunacy commission appointed for ourselves. "Why, boys," he groaned, "here you have about two hundred magazines and newspapers and the leading colleges and schools and libraries singing the praises of the Modern Library in so many different, yet singularly harmonious strains, that if you only had an ear for music you would recognize the tune. It's 'Johnnie, Put Your Price Up!'" "Well, we have been seriously considering raising our price," we answered. "I should hope so," he continued, somewhat less gloomily. "Smyth of the New York Times, Kerfoot of Life, Davis of the Evening Post, Gerould of the Bellman, Sell of the Chicago News, N. P. D. of the Globe; and the Independent, Reedy's Mirror, Philadelphia Ledger, The Boston Transcript, the Philadelphia Press, the best papers on the Pacific coast—why, great guns, all the critics say the Modern Library was the literary sensation of 1917. You have given the book-loving public the biggest bargain ever. With your fine titles and valuable introductions and attractive binding and clear print, sixty cents is simply ridiculous. What is the new price going to be?" "We have been thinking of seventy-five cents"—"Figure your costs!" he angrily interrupted, gulping down a Benedictine and brandy. "You can't do it! Everything is up from 10 to 200% since you started—from composition and plates to binding; from office salaries to royalties. And I understand one of you had the nerve to get married recently. Heaven help her at 75c a volume."

"Yes, there is a lot in what you say, my friend," the newly married one of us admitted, after the waiter had softly reminded us that we were not the only ones in the room. "We don't criticise you or any of the others for asking more money for the books you are publishing. We know you are entitled to it. We know that you are simply business men—not Profiteers. We, too, have been thinking about a higher price, but we cannot forget that the Modern Library is a unique institution. When we started it we announced that we did not expect to get rich, and that that was not primarily our ambition. So we have decided to stick to the old price—sixty cents per volume, postage 6c. extra—and we are going to add new titles regularly, with the best introductions we can buy. All the additional support we will ask of our friends is to buy four volumes where they used to buy two, and twenty instead of only ten."

We got our hats (paying for them as usual) and waited a moment for our friend to join us, but he could only gasp feebly, as he lit his fifth fifty-cent cigar, "Don't wait for me, boys. The shock is too great—or may be you're only joking."

We are not—here's the list of titles now included in the Modern Library. They are all hand-bound in limp croft leather, and sell at all stores for sixty cents per volume, 6c. extra by mail. Check the titles you want.

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and ignominious surrender on the wild boar hunt, there is a thrill in that snowy twilight and those awakened villages, and we forget the failure of the adventure in the Persian looms and the Greek Beau Brummel who had "spent certain early spring days on top of a windmill, looking out on the blue strait between the mainland of Asia Minor and the island of Mytilene, building fires of driftwood, to keep himself warm." And even if Mr. Dwight dwells comfortably enough in Hamadan, surrounded with the flavor of missionaries and gramophones, what adventure there is in that Mohammedan pageant of The Great Slaughter, the fierce and colorful length of which he watched from the roof of a Persian house!

At times, however, there is almost too much of the "colony" in these Persian miniatures, a little too many amiable European soirées. One detects, too, a certain invincible New England strain in Mr. Dwight, which, in spite of his years in the east, keeps in him a sense of the queerness and slight patronizableness of the natives, the servants, the women at the loom, the satraps. His love is genuine and eager, and his sketches of such characters as the Sea of Sciences are inimitable. He pokes his way everywhere, and is responsive to all sorts of political and historical gossip. He cannot be charged merely with using the east as literary material. And yet he is not quite absorbed into the life, in the way that the best travellers are. He is still the "Firengi," the Frank, not yet disinterestedly saturated with the strange life which, however, so satisfies him. That is why his best passages are his impressions rather than his observations, those vivid chapters about the romantic journey from Tiflis over the Caspian to Hamadan, the wild mountains and sunlit plains, the sights and smells of Kazvin and the Bazaar, the hunt and the pageant.

This is why perhaps also his scholarship, though not unnecessarily pretentious, has the air of adorning a tale, rather than of providing the significant background for his observations. Mr. Dwight could not write about the lore of Persian rugs and the life of Avicenna in any but a charming way, and yet the reader is kept wishing that the traveller had pressed on past his Persian winter into the further wonders of Teheran and Ispahan. For chapters like The Country of the Sky and The Caravan would bewitch any book. And it is captious to complain, when this easy and gracious style would lighten the heaviness of any learning. Mr. Dwight himself tells you to skip the chapter on rug books unless you either read or write them.

R. B.

# An Epic Biography

*The Little Grandmother of the Russian Revolution. Reminiscences and letters of Catherine Breshkovsky. Edited by Alice Stone Blackwell. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. $2.00.*

AMONG the poems and prose sagas of the heroes and heroines of the human race, the records of the Valkyries are very few. As convincing Valkyrie records in the fields of fact and of fiction one may fairly count Sir E. T. Cook's fascinating biography of Florence Nightingale, George Meredith's portrait of Diana of the Crossways, Turgenev's Elena in On the Eve, Mark Twain's Joan of Arc, Bernard Shaw's Lydia Carew in Cashel Byron, Swinburne's critique of Emily Brontë. Without going further one may assume that for the writer fitted to chronicle the ways of a Valkyrie, peculiar qualifications seem to be requisite, a knowledge of history, a vital sense of national causes, an appreciation of poetry in human souls, and of the rhythm of large movements forward.

All these qualifications characterize the editorship of the reminiscences and letters of Catherine Breshkovsky, recently assembled by Alice Stone Blackwell in one of the most profoundly charming histories we possess.

From the first words, the distant bugles blow; the steeds are plunging forward; the clear, deep-bosomed voices, calling "Hoya! Hoya!" and everything is moving towards the future to the harmonies of:

> To thee old Cause!
> Thou peerless, passionate good cause.

Through Catherine's youthful dreams on her father's estate; through her student days in Petrograd with those Titanic Young Russians with whom Turgenev and Kropotkin have familiarized us in some sort; through her marriage; her conscientious decision to leave her dearly beloved husband, her child, her father and mother, in order to give herself to the cause of suffering Russia; through all the succeeding story of her hard, adventurous days of agitation among the peasants; her terrible years in prison, in Siberia, in solitary confinement; through seventy years to her last quoted words of golden affection to her American friends, through all the tale of her life, a deep fragrant breath, the presence of a great woman's generous nature, stirs like a fresh wind from afar to the closing page of the book.

See her as George Kennan saw her at thirty-five, in Siberia, at Selenginsk:

> "Her face had traces of much suffering, and her thick, dark, wavy hair, which had been cut short in prison at the mines, was streaked with gray. . . . She was, as I soon discovered a woman of much cultivation. She spoke French, German and English, was a fine musician, and impressed me as being in every way an attractive and interesting woman. . . . There was not another educated woman, so far as I know, within a hundred miles in any direction; she received from the government an allowance of a dollar and a quarter a week for her support; her correspondence was under police control; she was separated for life from her family and friends; and she had, it seemed to me, absolutely nothing to look forward to except a few years, more or less, of hardship and privation and at last burial in a lonely graveyard beside the Selenga river, where no sympathetic eye might ever rest upon the unpainted wooden cross that would briefly chronicle her life and death. . . . Almost the last words she said to me were: 'Mr. Kennan, we may die in exile, and our children may die in exile, and our children's children may die in exile, but something will come of it at last.' . . . I cannot recall her last words to me without feeling conscious that all my standards of courage, of fortitude, of heroic self-sacrifice have been raised for all time, and raised by the hand of a woman."

And now see her as a political exile at Irkutsk saw her, at seventy-two, after her two overwhelming years of solitary confinement, and as she was setting forth to life-long imprisonment at Yakutsk, Asia, in a locality so remote, so cold, that it freezes in August. He says:

> "She has become a little deaf; her shaggy hair is snow-white; but spiritually she is as strong as ever. On seeing her, at the first moment I could not keep from weeping, hiding my face on her breast. 'Look up, let me see what is the matter with you, rascal!'

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
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she said, 'I don't like to see sad faces of my little children. Cheer up, my boy, and speak loud, like a good officer at the front. I am a little deaf.' I looked at her; her eyes were full of tears; she was smiling. I was not able to utter a word."

The great, the first and obvious value of the book is of course as a revolutionary document, as the history of the fortunes of a brave revolutionist, bold and wise in counsel, strong in endurance. Yet one is held longest by the poetry, the sincerity and wisdom of the heroine's personal human relations. Her sense of liberty is revealed with an especial grace in her way of parting from her family and her husband. A young noble of radical social principles, he had shared her views up to a certain point. They had founded a school and a cooperative bank on his estate; but they soon discovered that without political changes, they could not advance far with these reforms; and that if they sought to achieve political changes, they would be imprisoned and exiled. Neither Catherine's husband nor her parents were willing to make these sacrifices, which she felt were her duty. With deep grief she parted from him and from her father and mother. She never saw any of them again. Shortly after she left them she was imprisoned and exiled; and they had all died before her return.

In life in our own country, one has often cause to observe that there is no resentment sharper nor more lasting than that which the somewhat more liberal seem frequently to entertain against those somewhat less liberal. But the difference between Madame Breshkovsky's social faith and that of those dearest to her, for which they were willing to give so very much less, never diminished her regard for them. "I had wonderful parents. If there is anything good in me, I owe it all to them." And we learn that she never ceased to consider her husband a noble and admirable figure. To come to an honorable parting of the ways, without any meanness of judgment against fellow-travellers who chose another road, here is a counsel of liberality and imagination of the heart worthy of that dream of the realization of human justice which she says has concerned her from the age of eight.

"And how is that dream, which is after all the dream of democracy, to be realized?" the reader will ask as he thinks of present-day Russia, as he considers the oppressive disorders and cheap, autocratic fallacies prevalent inside our own democracy today. Only by very plain and untiring daily work for freedom and justice, Catherine Breshkovsky seems to say, in many subtle and thrilling passages, recalling Lincoln in the homely grandeur and humility of their counsel. Impossible to say how valuable that counsel will prove in developing a sincere, common national spirit in Russia. At least it might profitably be read by every citizen of the United States.

E. F. W.

## Contributors

WILLIAM HARD—writer on public affairs; now investigating problems of organization in Washington for the New Republic; author of The Women of Tomorrow.

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